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This thesis analyzes the changing relationship between 
the United States and Venezuela since 1980.  In the last 
five years this relationship has become increasingly 
strained.  The thesis takes a holistic approach and looks 
at international, domestic, and individual levels of 
analysis to determine the causal factors in Venezuela’s 
shifting foreign policy.  The findings suggest that the new 
international environment and Venezuela’s petroleum 
reserves create the ability for Venezuela to slow 
integration with the United States.  Domestic factors 
explain this approach as an attempt to protect different 
interest groups.  At the individual level, President Chávez 
is a headline grabber but is not a significant source of 
bilateral tensions.  The findings indicate that the new 
international environment and Venezuelan political and 
economic culture are the important variables in explaining 
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This thesis examines the changing relationship between 
the United States and Venezuela over the last two decades.  
In the last five years this relationship has become 
increasingly strained as Venezuela reduced its focus on its 
neighbor to the north.  The thesis hypothesizes four 
explanations for this change:  1) A new post-Cold War 
international system.  2) Antagonism produced by unpopular 
U.S. policies towards Venezuela.  3) Domestic issues within 
Venezuela.  4) President Chávez’s leftist leanings and 
anti-U.S. rhetoric.  As a single case study, this thesis 
examines the above four causal factors (independent 
variables) to determine the extent they drive Venezuela’s 
changing foreign policy towards the United States 
(dependent variable).  International, domestic, and 
individual levels of analysis will be used to explain the 
changing relationship.  By using an international relations 
approach the thesis will identify which variables have 
explanatory power in this case. 
The key findings in this project are that the end of 
the Cold War and the rejection of the Washington consensus 
have contributed to Venezuela’s de-emphasis on the United 
States.  At the domestic level, a pacted democracy and oil 
led development have also played an important role in 
distancing Venezuela from the United States in this new 
environment.  At the individual level, President Chavez is 
an irritant to U.S. interests and an added cause to the 
distancing in relations but not the main cause. 
  xvi
The root causes for the distancing are the fundamental 
changes at the international level and the impact this has 
had in Venezuelan domestic politics and economics.  Further 
integration with the U.S. threatens domestic interest 
groups in Venezuela so other areas of the world are being 
looked to for integration.  This “threat” may or may not 
persist.  Washington must not attribute the shifts in the 
current relationship to President Chávez.  A “do nothing” 
approach is currently the best policy for the United States 
to purse with Venezuela as long as Venezuelan foreign 
policy does not threaten vital U.S. interests. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. OBJECTIVE 
This thesis examines the changing relationship between 
the United States and Venezuela over the last twenty years.  
Over the last decade, Venezuela has shifted its primary 
focus away from the United States.  The thesis hypothesizes 
four possible explanations for this change:  1) A new post-
Cold War international system.  2) Unpopular U.S. policies 
towards Venezuela.  3) Domestic issues within Venezuela.  
4) President Chávez’s leftist leanings and anti-U.S. 
rhetoric.  International, domestic, and individual levels 
of analysis will be examined to explain the changing 
relationship.  By using an international relations approach 
the thesis will identify which variables have more 
explanatory power in this case. 
Finding out the driving factors behind Venezuela’s 
reasons for pursing this new strategy is important for 
policy makers in both countries.  For example, if it is 
found that the problems between the countries are due to 
bad U.S. policies then this can be remedied.  However, if 
the difficulties are due to the new international system 
then the distancing between the two countries would be 
expected.  If domestic politics is the driving factor other 
policy solutions could be used to improve relations.  If 
Chávez is the problem, the solution would be to just wait 
until a new president comes to power. 
B. BACKGROUND 
 Venezuela was a staunch backer of the United States 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  From 1970 on Venezuela 
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took a more independent foreign policy stance but remained 
closely linked to the United States on issues important to 
Washington (stable oil supplier and Cold War ally).  
Venezuela never participated in an OPEC sponsored oil 
embargo against the United States.  Likewise, the United 
States never punished Venezuela with intervention or 
sanctions. 
In the latter half of the 1990s, Venezuela’s foreign 
policy shifted away from its primary orientation towards 
the United States.  This shift has diminished the emphasis 
on bilateral cooperation in such areas as military 
cooperation, economics, counterdrug efforts, and other 
issues of common concern.  Venezuela’s new foreign policy 
promotes a multipolar world and can be summed up as one 
that strives to insert the country onto the world stage as 
an active, autonomous, and independent agent. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 As a single case study, this thesis focuses on 
Venezuela’s changing foreign policy towards the United 
States (dependent variable).  It will analyze a number of 
possible causal factors (independent variables) driving 
these changes.  These include, the new post-Cold War 
international system, unpopular U.S. policies towards 
Venezuela, domestic issues within Venezuela, and President 
Chávez. 
International Relations Theory will be used to explain 
why the shift has occurred.  Specifically, K.J. Holsti’s 
asymmetrical interdependence theory will be used at the 
international level.  This theory holds that the following 
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may be among the outcomes expected by a country in this 
type of relationship. 
1) Terminate practices of joint policymaking, 
problem solving, or policy coordination; they may 
also withdraw support from, reduce participation 
in, institutions having supranational 
characteristics.  2) Alter asymmetrical 
relationships by significantly diversifying 
external contacts, building regional coalitions, 
or entering into regional integration schemes as 
a way of escaping domination by a hegemon.  3) 
Resist further integration but not seek to 
disintegrate or secede.1 
Jeffry Frieden’s political economy approach will be 
used to examine the domestic level.  This method uses the 
policy preferences of individual actors, how they form into 
groups that can influence politics, how these groups seek 
to obtain policies favorable to them in the context of the 
existing institutions, and the outcome these groups have on 
policy.2 
The highest levels of U.S. government have hinted that 
Chávez is the problem in Venezuela.3  Chapter V will 
determine if he is the causal factor for Venezuela’s more 
independent foreign policy.  At the individual level 
President Chávez will be compared to previous executives in 
order to establish what impact he has on bilateral 
relations.  Issues of contention between Chávez and the 
United States will also be looked at. 
                     
1 Holsti, K.J., “Change in the International System:  Interdependence, 
Integration, and Fragmentation,” in Alexander George, Ole Holsti, and Randolp 
Siverson, eds. Change in the International System, Westview Press, 1970, p.p. 
33-34. 
2 Frieden, Jeffry, “The Method of Analysis:  Modern Political Economy,” in 
Jeffry Frieden, Manuel Pastor, and Michael Tomz, eds. Modern Political Economy 
and Latin America, Westview Press, 2000, p.p. 42-43. 
3 “Bush Official:  Sharon a Proponent of Peace, Chávez a Problem”, CNN.com, 
02 Mar 2001, http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/03/02/bush.policy/index.html, [06 Mar 
2001]. 
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D. IMPORTANCE  
This thesis is important because it answers why 
relations between the two countries have become 
increasingly stressed over the last five years.  Once the 
sources of stress are known, U.S. policies can be 
implemented to strengthen bilateral cooperation.   This 
cooperation is vital because Venezuela is an important 
source of oil imports to the United States (among the top 
three importers since the early 1980s).  Venezuela is also 
a major transshipment country for illicit drugs from 
Colombia and therefore its cooperation is important in the 
drug war.  In the economic realm its collaboration will be 
needed in an eventual Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA). Finally, Venezuela’s desertion of its past policy 
of closeness to the United States may serve a demonstration 
effect that could alter U.S. relations with other Latin 
American countries. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
 Chapter II addresses the dependent variable in this 
case:  the shift in Venezuela’s foreign policy.  It reviews 
relations between the two countries since 1980.  This 
chapter has three objectives:  1) To describe Venezuela’s 
foreign policy behavior when it saw the United States as 
its foremost interest, 2) To show that Venezuela’s foreign 
policy towards the United States has changed, and 3) To 
identify the approximate date of this shift. 
 Chapter III examines the international variables to 
determine their impact on the relationship.  Specifically 
the end of the Cold War, asymmetrical interdependence, the 
neoliberal economic model, and U.S. policy towards 
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Venezuela will be addressed to determine if any or all of 
these are causal variables. 
 Chapter IV addresses the power of domestic politics in 
the relationship.  Is foreign policy being subordinated to 
the needs of the domestic regime?  The political model 
failed in the early 1990s along with neoliberal economic 
reform.  It will be determined if this domestic chaos 
impacted bilateral relations. 
Chapter V will look at the rhetoric and actions of 
President Chávez to determine the impact he has had on the 
bilateral relationship and if his actions are really that 
much different than previous presidents. 
Finally, Chapter VI offers conclusions on which level 
of analysis and variables have the most explanatory power.  
Additionally, some policy recommendations will be offered 
to improve the relationship. 
The main findings of this thesis are that the end of 
the Cold War and the rejection of the Washington consensus 
have contributed to Venezuela’s de-emphasis on the United 
States.  At the domestic level, a pacted democracy and oil 
led development have also played an important role in 
distancing Venezuela from the United States.  At the 
individual level, President Chavez is an irritant to U.S. 
interests.  He is an added cause to the distancing in 
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II. THE SHIFT AWAY FROM THE U.S.:  CHANGES IN 
VENEZUELA’S FOREIGN POLICY. 
Since the establishment of a stable democracy in 
Venezuela in 1958 the U.S. has perceived Venezuela as one 
of its greatest allies in Latin America.  In 1982 it was 
noted in the U.S. Senate:  “Venezuela was a country that 
contributed to regional stability by subsidizing oil prices 
and providing financial assistance to less well off 
nations.”4  Venezuela also “joined with Canada, Mexico, and 
the United States in the formation of the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative, and was an example of a pluralistic and 
democratic society”5 in the region.  Similarly, Venezuela 
has seen the U.S. as its most important ally economically 
and as a strategic partner in issues such as safety and 
free passage of shipping in the Caribbean, support of 
democracy in Latin America, and opposition to the expansion 
of Cuban influence in the hemisphere. 
Over the last decade there has been a shift in 
Venezuelan foreign policy from seeing the United States as 
its leading interest to a focus on other countries and 
issues.  On a 1999 visit to Venezuela, Congressman Bill 
Archer (R-TX), Chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, stated “the United States has often taken for 
granted its good relations with Venezuela in the past—and 
that now we must all work to foster those good relations in 
the future.”6  The altering relationship has not gone 
                     
4 “Proposed Sale of F-16’s to Venezuela”, Committee on Foreign Relations 
United States Senate, February 05, 1982.  p. 5.  U.S. Government Printing 
Office. 
5 Ibid. 
6 “Report on Trade and Economic Growth Mission to Venezuela, Chile, and 
Brazil”, Committee on Ways and Means U.S. House of Representatives, March 31, 
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undetected in the Bush administration.  An unnamed senior 
official noted that President Bush views Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chávez as “a problem.”7 
The over-arching argument of this chapter suggests 
that economic issues are driving Venezuela’s relationship 
with the United States.  This thesis aims to distinguish 
the puzzle to be explained (dependent variable), 
Venezuela’s shift in foreign policy away from its primary 
orientation towards the United States, from the factors 
doing the explaining (independent variables).  The 
indications of this “problem” (dependent variable) are 
evident and will be discussed in detail in this chapter; 
the causes (independent variables) cannot be attributed 
purely to President Chávez and will be discussed in the 
following three chapters.  These include, the new post-Cold 
War international system and U.S. policies towards 
Venezuela (Chapter III), domestic issues within Venezuela 
(Chapter IV), and President Chávez (Chapter V). 
In common with any state, Venezuela’s interests and 
views do not always agree with those of the United States.  
Historic and undeviating points of contention have been the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, nuclear weapons, and sovereignty 
issues.  The 1970s saw a more independent Venezuela as its 
internal guerrilla threat abated, Soviet-United States 
relations warmed, and oil revenues increased.8  This was in 
contradiction to the 1960s that saw almost total agreement 
with the U.S. on issues in both the United Nations and the 
                     
1999.  p. 6.  U.S. Government Printing Office. 
7 “Bush Official:  Sharon a Proponent of Peace, Chávez a Problem”, CNN.com, 
02 Mar 2001, http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/03/02/bush.policy/index.html, [06 Mar 
2001]. 
8 Ewell, Judith, Venezuela and the United States:  From Monroe’s Hemisphere 
to Petroleum’s Empire, University of Georgia Press, 1996, p. 211. 
  9 
Organization of American States (OAS).  During the 1960s, 
Venezuela also remained out of the Non-Aligned Movement due 
to the movement’s aggressive political agenda and the 
influence exercised by Fidel Castro.9  Despite its more 
independent foreign policy, argued by some to be 
strengthened by global oil shortages,10 Venezuela maintained 
shared interests with the United States throughout most of 
the last two decades. 
This chapter will discuss the dependent variable in 
this case study, Venezuela’s shift in foreign policy away 
from the United States.  Specifically, Venezuela’s foreign 
policy behavior towards the United States since 1980 will 
be analyzed with three ends in mind. First the chapter will 
describe Venezuela’s behavior when it saw the United States 
as its number one foreign policy interest.  Second, it will 
show that Venezuelan foreign policy towards the U.S. has 
changed. Lastly, it will show the main shift came during 
the term of President Rafael Caldera, who held office prior 
to President Chávez.  I will also examine linked interests 
in diplomatic, bilateral relations, oil, and 
integration/trade spheres. 
In general, I will argue that the end of the Cold War 
and the country’s oil wealth have allowed Venezuela to 
pursue different policies in dealing with its neighbor to 
the north.  This changing relationship mostly revolves 
around economic interests.  Venezuela’s economic 
development plan of using oil rents to protect domestic 
industry makes the country vulnerable to globalization and 
further economic integration with the United States.  For 
                     
9 Ibid. 
10 Ewell, p. 201. 
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this reason, Venezuela is looking at other countries to 
expand markets for non-oil exports. 
A. DIPLOMATIC LINKS 
Throughout the 1980s the core of Venezuela’s 
relationship with the United States remained strong despite 
the fact that Venezuela continued its more autonomous 
foreign policy of the 1970s.  These basic strategic 
interests were regional in nature and included the oil 
relationship, security of Caribbean sea-lanes, a desire to 
promote political stability and democracy in the region, 
and opposition to Cuban influence. 
Venezuela at times joined with third world nations in 
the United Nations to vote against the United States and at 
other times backed U.S. interests.  Notwithstanding shared 
interests Venezuela was not a staunch ally across all issue 
areas.  In fact from 1984 to 2000, Venezuela voted against 
the United States in the United Nations at a higher rate 
than the Latin American average every year except two 
(1990, 1997).11  Venezuela most consistently opposed 
Washington on the issues of Nicaragua, Palestine, and 
nuclear arms. 
Despite disagreements on issues important to it, 
Venezuela muted criticism of its larger neighbor and 
maintained a positive relationship.  In 1982 Venezuela 
along with Mexico, Colombia, and Panama formed the 
Contadora Group to bring an end to the problems in 
Nicaragua yet “Washington’s obvious distaste for Contadora 
led Caracas to play a relatively quiet role within the 
                     
11 Voting Practices in the United Nations, United States Department of State, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983-2001 editions. 
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group.”12  Venezuela was on the United Nations Security 
Council in 1986 when the United States bombed Libya.  
Notwithstanding the fact that Libya was an OPEC member 
Venezuela sided with the United States by abstaining from a 
United Nations Resolution that condemned the bombing and 
also refused to support an OPEC oil embargo against the 
United States. 
The 1990s has seen an increased divergence in 
Venezuela’s policy with respect to the United States.  
Internationally, the Cold War ended and neoliberal 
economics was accepted as the norm.  In Venezuela, domestic 
chaos resulted as traditional parties collapsed and 
economic reform failed. 
During the 1990s Venezuela became increasingly 
critical of Washington’s policy towards Cuba.  From 1992 to 
2000 Venezuela voted opposite to the United States on all 
resolutions regarding Cuba.13  In the 1996 Summit of the 
Americas Venezuela voted in favor of a resolution 
condemning the U.S. for the Helms-Burton Law.  In 1999, 
Venezuela voted against the United States on a human rights 
resolution on Cuba and on March 28, 2001 Venezuela called 
for the reinstatement of Cuba into the OAS.14 
In 1994 Venezuela’s agenda at the Summit of the 
Americas included solving social problems caused by the 
opening of economies, hemispheric energy integration, and a 
hemispheric plan against corruption.  Sanctions and 
development have become new issues of disagreement in both 
                     
12 Ewell, p. 222. 
13 Voting Practices in the United Nations, United States Department of State, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983-2001 editions. 
14 “Venezuela Quiere Reintegracion Plena de Cuba en la OEA”, El 
Universal.com, 28 Mar 2001, http://www.el-
universal.com/2001/03/28/28032001_24.html, [28 Mar 2001]. 
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United Nations and OAS forums.  In United Nations 
resolutions considered important to the United States since 
1991 (sanctions, development, debt, and a stable 
international financial system) Venezuela voted contrary to 
the United States in every case. 
After the 1999 election of President Hugo Chávez 
diplomatic relations have become more confrontational.  
Chávez became the first western leader to visit Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein.  On this trip, he reiterated that 
the “Venezuelan position supports any accord against any 
kind of boycott or sanctions that are applied against Iraq 
or any other country in the world.”15  The current 
government’s plan stresses inserting Venezuela into a 
multipolar international community as an active, 
autonomous, and independent agent.  Some specific goals 
include accelerating regional integration through a Great 
Conference of Latin American and Caribbean Nations, a 
common market for the Andean Pact, joining the Andean Pact 
and the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR), 
promoting the principle of equality among states, 
denouncing the voracity of world financial powers, and a 
strengthening of OPEC.16  These new goals will have serious 
implications for bilateral relations with the United 
States.  The general trend on Venezuela’s position on 
issues important to the U.S. can be seen in Figure 1. 
                     
15 “Chávez Ends Visit to Iraq After Drive Around Baghdad with Hussein”, 
CNN.com, 11 Aug 2000, 
www10.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/08/11/iraq.chavez.01/index.html, [08 Mar 2001]. 
16 Plan de Gobierno, http://www.venezuela.gov.ve/mainhechos.html, [08 Mar 
2001]. 



























Figure 1. Venezuelan Coincidence with United States Votes 
in the United Nations (percentage) 
From:  Voting Practices in the United Nations, United 
States Department of State, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1985-2001 editions. 
 
B. BILATERAL RELATIONS 
Bilateral relations have focused in the past and 
continue to revolve around petroleum.  The U.S. sees 
Venezuela as an important ally and as a vital source of 
petroleum.  Similarly, Venezuela sees itself as a trusted 
and reliable supplier of petroleum to the United States 
during war and peace.17  Issues surrounding oil have not 
been free of disagreements.  From 1959 to 1973 the United 
States maintained oil quotas against Venezuela and in the 
mid 1990s gasoline imports were barred for environmental 
reasons.  In general, both countries consider the security 
                     
17 “Sostiene Burelli Rivas, Visita de Clinton a Venezuela Beneficia a EEUU”, 
El Nacional.com, 08 Mar 1997, 
http://128.241.247.116/archive/result.asp?file=d:\www\nacional\home\archive\199
7\03\08\250.htm&rest=Clinton+, [15 Jul 2001]. 
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of the oil fields and freedom of movement of this commodity 
through the Caribbean as vital to their interests. 
This shared view was the basis of a special military 
relationship between the two countries.  The sale of F-16 
fighter jets to Venezuela in 1982 reflected this 
relationship.  Venezuela took delivery of their first F-16A 
in 1984, just five years after the first operational F-16A 
was delivered in January 1979 to the 388th Tactical Fighter 
Wing at Hill Air Force Base, Utah.18 In the hearing on the 
proposed sale before the Committee on Foreign Relations in 
the Senate Venezuela was extolled for its importance in the 
Caribbean.  Senator Charles Percy (R-IL) noted before the 
hearing began that, “It is important to reiterate that 
Venezuela is a strong ally of the United States.  Venezuela 
is one of the few successful democracies in Latin America.  
It supports U.S. policy in El Salvador; it is an important 
donor in the new Caribbean basin initiative.  It exports 
650,000 barrels of oil per day to the United States.”19  
Even in 2001, Venezuela remains the only country in Latin 
America to have purchased F-16s from the United States. 
Security of the oil fields and the Caribbean remains a 
priority but for reasons to be discussed in detail in 
Chapter III, this issue has decreased in importance.  The 
new military issues of the 1990s revolve around the drug 
war.  In 1991, Venezuela signed an agreement to allow the 
U.S. Coast Guard to board Venezuelan vessels.  In 1994 a 
hot pursuit agreement was signed which allowed U.S. 
military aircraft to chase suspected drug traffickers into 
                     
18 “F-16 Fighting Falcon” USAF Fact Sheet, 
http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/F_16_Fighting_Falcon.html, [08 Oct 2001]. 
19 “Proposed Sale of F-16’s to Venezuela”, Committee on Foreign Relations 
United States Senate, February 05, 1982.  U.S. Government Printing Office. 
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Venezuelan airspace.  In 1996, Secretary of Defense William 
Perry visited Venezuela with the goal of strengthening 
anti-drug cooperation.  In 1997 the two countries signed a 
joint declaration of Strategic Alliance Against Drugs. The 
declaration addressed most of the areas in the 1988 UN 
Convention on Drugs that Venezuela signed in 1991. 
However, since the mid 1990s cooperation in the anti-
drug arena has become strained.  In 1996 the U.S. Coast 
Guard was not allowed to board Venezuelan ships using legal 
detachments (LEDATS) based aboard third nation ships.  
Starting in 1997 then President Caldera denied U.S. 
requests for over flight permission, a pattern followed by 
President Chávez.  Many experts in the United States also 
see Venezuela’s continued refusal to extradite Venezuelan 
nationals as noncooperative in the anti-drug effort.  This 
policy was strengthened by the 1999 constitution that 
prohibits the extradition of Venezuelans. 
Other vital bilateral issues for Venezuela revolve 
around economic and sovereignty issues.  On January 23, 
1995, Venezuela filed a complaint against the United States 
regarding discrimination against gasoline imports.  The EPA 
had stricter standards for imported gasoline than domestic.  
This resulted in the loss of most of the Eastern market for 
Venezuelan gasoline.  The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
dispute panel agreed with Venezuela one year later.  It 
took another year and half for the U.S. to sign a new 
regulation allowing the gasoline imports.  On the sensitive 
issue of sovereignty Venezuela refused the help of U.S. 
troops after the December 1999 floods.  President Chávez 
clearly stated, “I want to clarify to the world that North 
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American troops are not going to come to Venezuela.”20  
Venezuela has also come out against Plan Colombia because 
of concerns of spillover and American unilateral action. 
C. OIL 
Since the discovery of oil in 1922, Venezuela’s number 
one trading partner has been the United States and its most 
important export has been oil.  Oil exports to the U.S. 
have traditional been around half of Venezuela’s total 
exports, 90 percent of these being petroleum.  The U.S. 
consumes roughly half of Venezuela’s total oil production 
(1.45 million barrels/day in 1999).21  Percentage of trade 
to the U.S. shadows petroleum imports.22  The percentage of 
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Figure 2. Venezuela Oil Exports as a Percentage of Total 
Exports (1930-1995) 
From:  “Principal Commodities Exported”, Thorpe, Rosemary, 
Progress, Poverty and Exclusion:  an Economic History of 
Latin America in the 20th Century, The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1998, p.347. 
                     
20 “Chávez Spurns Flood Relief From U.S. Troops”, CNN.com, 13 Jan 2000, 
http://www3.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/01/13/venezuela.us/index.html, [08 Mar 
2001]. 
21 “Petroleum Imports by Country of Origin, 1960-1999”, Annual Energy Review, 
1999, Energy Information Administration, July 2000, p. 125. 
22 “Table S3.  Crude Oil and Petroleum Imports:  1986 – Present”, United 
States Department of Energy Website, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/petroleum_supply
_monthly/current/pdf/stable3.pdf, [09 OCT 2001]. 
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Historically, Venezuela cooperated with the United 
States to ensure world oil supplies were adequate and in 
1996 Venezuela once again allowed foreign investment in its 
state-owned oil industry.  One example of direct 
cooperation with the U.S. in addition to voting against an 
oil embargo after the bombing of Libya was during the Gulf 
War.  Venezuela initially supported Iraq but after a visit 
by President Bush Venezuela took the U.S. position and 
increased oil production to bring down prices. 
Prior to President Chávez, Venezuela, despite being a 
founding member of OPEC, was a frequent quota buster.  As 
noted previously, a specific goal of the Chávez 
administration is to strengthen OPEC.  Chávez visited other 
OPEC leaders in 2000 and organized the second meeting of 
OPEC leaders in its 40-year history.  Many have credited 
him with the resurgence of the cartel and a subsequent rise 
in oil prices.23 
Venezuela was the number one exporter of oil to the 
United States from 1995 to 1998 (among the top three 
suppliers since 1983).   In 1999 Venezuela was again the 
number three supplier behind Canada and Saudi Arabia. 
D. INTEGRATION AND TRADE 
The 1980 to 1989 time period saw little effort on the 
part of Venezuela in integration and trade agreements.  
After 1989, trade and integration became a more important 
issue as Venezuela increased its participation in 
                     
23 “Venezuela’s Chávez Exhorts OPEC Leaders to Demand Justice From Developed 
Nations”, CNN.com, 28 Sep 2000, 
http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/09/28/opec.summit/index.html, [06 Mar 
2001]. 
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international agreements as part of its economic 
liberalization program.24 
Even before Chávez took office in 1999, Venezuela 
began a process of integration with Latin America, the EU, 
and Asia.  For example, President Rafael Caldera signed an 
agreement to sell orimulsion (an extra heavy crude oil) to 
China in 1996. 
With the rise of Hugo Chávez to the presidency, 
integration efforts have expanded to include economic, 
military, and diplomatic spheres.  Chávez has repeatedly 
stated his desire for a united Latin America modeled after 
Simon Bolivar’s original plans for a United States of Latin 
America.  Chávez has also voiced support for a South 
American NATO-type force to balance the United States.  The 
current government’s plan stresses inserting Venezuela in 
the international community as an active, autonomous, and 
independent agent.25  Some specific goals include 
accelerating regional integration through a Great 
Conference of Latin American and Caribbean Nations, a 
common market for the Andean Pact, joining the Andean Pact 
and MERCOSUR, and a strengthening of OPEC.  Integration 
efforts are not new but what is new is the emphasis on non-
economic areas of cooperation, OPEC unity, and Cuba.  In 
addition integration efforts by Venezuela that 
traditionally focused on Latin America now also include 
other areas of the world.  There is however, no mention of 
strengthening relations or integration with the United 
States.  These new integration and trade pacts have 
                     
24 See Table one for a list of major agreements Venezuela has entered into or 
strengthened since 1980. 
25 Plan de Gobierno, http://www.venezuela.gov.ve/mainhechos.html, [08 Mar 
2001]. 
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increased trade with many regions but trade with the U.S. 
has remained static.  Following is a synopsis of trade 
developments with the United States, Latin America, and the 
EU. 
Agreement Year 
The Treaty of Montevideo 1980 
Latin American Integration Agreement (ALADI) 1984 
Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) 1992 
Free Trade Agreement between Colombia and Venezuela 1992 
Free Trade Agreement between Chile and Venezuela 1993 
The G3, consisting of Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela 1994 
World Trade Organization (WTO) 1994 
Preferential General System in the EU  1995 
The Andean Community (replaced Andean Pact) 1996 
 
Table 1.   Important Commercial and Integration Agreements:  
1980-2000. 
From:  “Commercial and Integration Agreements”, Embassy of 
Venezuela Washington D.C., http://www.embavenez-
us.org/comercio/commerce.html [07 Mar 01]. 
 
1. The United States 
Latin America is the fastest growing regional trading 
partner for the United States.  Between 1990 and 1999, 
total U.S. trade (exports plus imports) with Latin America 
grew by 163 percent (Asia was a distant second at 82 
percent).  Yet among countries listed in a Congressional 
Research Service report Venezuela had the second lowest 
growth in exports to the United States over this time 
period at 18.9 percent (or a paltry 1.9 percent growth per 
year).  Latin America saw exports increase by 162.7 percent 
to the United States.  Venezuela imports from the United 
States grew 74.2 percent, the third lowest among countries 
listed.  The Latin American average was 162.8 percent.26 
                     
26 “U.S. Lain American Trade:  Recent Trends”, CRS Report to Congress, March 
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2. Latin America 
The Andean Pact has a long history in South America.  
The year 1996 saw further evolution in this trade bloc with 
the ratification by Venezuela of the Andean Community.  The 
goal is to make the regional group a political alliance 
similar to the EU with free movement of capital and labor 
across national borders, an Andean Parliament, and an 
Andean Consultative Group to coordinate multilateral 
projects in the region. The 1992 signing of a common 
external tariff increased trade with Colombia by 200 
percent and 60 percent with Ecuador.27  The 1992 agreement 
brought average tariffs down to 10 percent (from 30 percent 
prior to the CET).  The agreement for a customs union was 
signed on March 10, 1996 and took effect in June 1998.  It 
allowed countries to add a 15 percent surcharge and double 
the customs handling fee (one percent to two percent) on 
about 800 products.  This effectively raised the average 
tariff in the region to 11 ½ percent.28  
The Free Trade Agreement with the Caribbean that took 
effect in 1993 has seen positive signs.  This innovative 
one-way agreement allows the Caribbean countries free 
access to the Venezuelan market for ten years.  After that 
period, the agreement will become reciprocal, giving 
Venezuela free access to the Caribbean market (starting in 
January 2003).  Although currently a small percentage of 
imports come from the Caribbean Region they have tripled 
                     
2000.  http://www.fpc.gov/CRS_reps/crslatrd.htm, [08 Oct 2001]. 
27 Ferguson, James, Venezuela:  A Guide to the People, Politics, and Culture, 
Monthly Review Press, 1994, p. 45. 
28 “Venezuela:  Recent Economic Developments”, IMF Staff Country Reports No. 
98/117, November 4, 1998, p 39.  
http://www.imf.org/external/country/VEN/index.htm, [01 Mar 2001]. 
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since the signing of the agreement in 1992.  Exports 
increased by 32 percent from 1994 to 1999.29  
Currently, integration with MERCOSUR is mostly 
rhetoric at the Venezuela to MERCOSUR level.  Thus far 
President Chávez has only expressed interest in joining 
MERCOSUR but nothing concrete has been done.  Exports to 
MERCOSUR have grown 14 percent per year from 1990 to 2000.  
Venezuela is the top exporter and importer to MERCOSUR of 
the Andean Pact countries.30  
Venezuela is also pursuing integration with individual 
countries in Latin America as can be seen by the emphasis 
on Brazil, the G-3 agreement, the free trade agreement with 
Chile, and increased trade with Cuba. 
In 1994, President Caldera made Brazil his number one 
foreign policy objective in the face of much domestic 
criticism.  Chávez has followed this lead and in 1999 
signed an agreement in Brazil that agreed to the proposal 
for a joint venture between Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) 
and Petrobras of Brazil called the "Petroamerica" company. 
Imports from Chile have increased 45 percent since the 
implementation of the free trade agreement while exports to 
Chile have increased by 33 percent.31  In March 2001, Chile 
and Venezuela further strengthened their trade agreement by 
adding mineral, lumber, and agriculture to items covered 
under the accord.  It is estimated this will increase 
                     
29 Foreign Trade Information System (SICE) website, Organization Of American 
States, http://www.sice.oas.org/default.asp, [01 Aug 2001]. 
30 “Venezuela es el Pais Andino que mas Exporta Hacia el Mercosur”, El 
Universal.  17 April 2001. 
31 SICE. 
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Chilean investment in Venezuela from $300 million to $450 
million.32 
In 2000 Venezuela become the top-trading partner with 
Cuba, increasing trade by 80 percent over 1999.  Recent 
agreements signed between the two countries also included 
education and medical exchanges and a technical agreement 
between the civil defense organizations of both countries. 
3. European Union 
Links with the EU were strengthened when Venezuela 
signed the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) that 
took effect in January 1995 and expires on December 31, 
2004.  The GSP was designed to encourage access to the 
European market for Latin American exports, especially 
those from less developed countries. The European Union has 
granted Latin America preferential access conditions 
(exemption or reduction of tariffs) for all industrial 
products as well as numerous agricultural products.  Since 
December 1990, the EU has granted special GSP preferences 
for those Andean countries committed to tackling drug 
production and trafficking (since 1995 for Venezuela).  The 
EU has also agreed to draw up a study with Andean countries 
on a trade system that could replace the GSP. Andean 
countries, including Venezuela, have asked to negotiate a 
free trade agreement with the EU. 
Venezuela has experienced success in it economic 
integration with Latin America.  It also sees the EU as 
another important market.  It is no surprise that the 
Chávez administration is concentrating on four regions for 
                     
32 “Chile y Venezuela Firmarán Acuerdos Agrícolas, Mineros, y Maderos”, El 
Universal.com, 08 March 2001, 
http://www.eluniversal.com/2001/03/08/08032110_72961.html, [08 Mar 2001]. 
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further integration: the Andean Community, MERCOSUR, 
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), and the 
EU. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
From the above facts, it is clear that Venezuela’s 
foreign policy became more divergent from the United States 
during the second Rafeal Caldera administration (1994-1999) 
and has accelerated under Chávez.  This shift has been in 
the economic and integration spheres.  Both diplomatically 
and in bilateral relations Venezuela is maintaining the 
status quo of a critical partner in its relationship with 
the U.S.  The modified strategy appears to be an attempt by 
Venezuela to diversify its economic partners after a 70-
year reliance on the United States as its top-trading 
partner.  This shift is significant because these markets 
may also absorb petroleum exports and make the United 
States more reliant on Middle East oil. 
The next step of this case study will be to determine 
what motivated Venezuela to focus on other international 
relationships and issues ahead of the United States.  
Possible causal factors that will be looked at are 1) the 
new post-cold war international system, 2) displeasure at 
U.S. policies towards Venezuela, 3) domestic issues within 
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III. INTERNATIONAL FACTORS EXPLAINING VENEZUELA’S 
SHIFT IN FOREIGN POLICY 
This chapter examines the four most significant 
aspects on an international level affecting Venezuela-
United States relations over the last 20 years:  the end of 
the Cold War, asymmetrical interdependence, the impact of 
the neoliberal economic model, and United States policy 
towards Venezuela.  It will be determined to what extent 
these events altered the relationship between Venezuela and 
the United States. 
Briefly, the arguments are as follows.  The end of the 
Cold War removed the penalty for reaching out to other 
allies for those countries under the United States 
umbrella; therefore Venezuela can diversify allies with 
less risk of damaging its relations with the hegemonic 
power.  International relations theory predicts countries 
in asymmetrical interdependence will try to get out of 
these associations by diversifying their international 
political and economic relationships.  The neoliberal 
economic model (referred to in this thesis as the 
Washington Consensus) is the accepted framework for 
development.  The new model consists of prudent 
macroeconomic policies, outward orientation, and free 
market capitalism. The United States exerts pressure on 
countries to adopt this model.  Lastly, United States 
policy will be looked at to see if unpopular policies have 
caused a reactive shift in Venezuela’s foreign policy.  
This chapter will conclude by assessing how well these 
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external international factors explain the changes in 
Venezuela’s approach towards the United States. 
A. THE END OF THE COLD WAR 
Venezuela fought a Cold War battle on its territory 
against Cuban-backed insurgents in the 1960s.  The United 
States backed Venezuela in this struggle against revolution 
and communism.  Both countries saw the Cold War as vital to 
their survival interests and this made cooperation on Cold 
War matters straightforward.  Venezuela was recognized as 
an important ally and a reliable source of petroleum in the 
event of a Soviet advance into the Middle East.  The United 
States justification of selling F-16s to Venezuela was “to 
deter attacks on its oil and other resources.”33  
Venezuela’s foreign policy during the Cold War focused on 
anticommunism and the rejection of rightist dictatorships.  
For Ewell, United States-Venezuelan relations from 1958 to 
1990 were played out in the global context of the Cold 
War.34  Because both countries had the fundamental shared 
interest of anticommunism disagreement in other areas was 
muted. This explains why Venezuela was considered a strong 
backer of United States interests when its United Nations 
voting shows just the opposite.  From 1982-1989, Venezuela 
voted with the United States at a lower rate than Latin 
America. 
The end of the Cold War brought changing interests and 
priorities to both countries.  The United States saw drugs, 
democracy, and trade as the key issues in Latin America.  
                     
33 “Proposed Sale of F-16’s to Venezuela”, Committee on Foreign Relations 
United States Senate, February 05, 1982.  p. 17.  U.S. Government Printing 
Office. 
 
34 Ewell, p. 199. 
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Venezuela focused on diversification in its worldwide 
relationships, a workable economic model, and stabilizing a 
domestic political crisis. 
Current United States national security interests and 
objectives in Latin America are to shape a stable, peaceful 
regional security environment, foster American prosperity 
through trade and integration, and promote democracy.35  The 
United States position as hegemon is unrivaled in the world 
and is stronger compared to Venezuela than during the Cold 
War.  In general, the United States pursues its policies in 
a bilateral manner.  For example, cooperation in the drug 
war is sought on a country-by-country basis, as are most 
economic agreements. 
For Venezuela, the end of the Cold War has taken away 
the penalty for seeking ties outside the hemisphere because 
external actors are no longer a threat to the United 
States.  Previous to 1990, Venezuela’s major links to non-
hemisphere nations were its OPEC allies.  But during the 
Cold War there was no question allegiance to the United 
States trumped OPEC unity.  Venezuela never participated in 
any of the OPEC or Arab embargoes against the United States 
since the creation of the cartel. 
After the 1989 collapse of the communist world, 
Venezuela began a “defensive, or cautious, approach of 
simultaneously seeking firmer economic ties both with the 
United States and with other global trading partners.”36  
The trend of further integration with the United States 
slowed after 1994 when the Caldera administration reversed 
                     
35 Schulz, Donald, The United States and Latin America:  Shaping an Elusive 
Future, Strategic Studies Institute Report, U.S. Army War College, March 2000, 
p. 16. 
36 Ewell, p. 201. 
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economic liberalization and made Brazil the top priority in 
foreign and economic policy.  Venezuela continues to expand 
its ties with countries outside the hemisphere and OPEC, 
most significantly Russia and China.  The Chávez 
administration has as one of its principle goals to “insert 
Venezuela in the international community as an active, 
autonomous, and independent agent.”37 
Venezuela is now able to play a more active role in 
Latin America because issues have been taken out of the 
context of anticommunism.  Nowhere have this been more 
evident than its dealings with Cuba.  Venezuela has 
significantly increased political, economic, and social 
ties with the island nation.  Recent accords signed between 
the two countries include education and medical exchanges 
and a technical agreement between the civil defense 
organizations of both countries.  In 2000 Venezuela passed 
Spain as Cuba’s top trading partner. 
An example of how the new environment allowed for 
increased Venezuelan participation at the international 
level was the employment of forces to Central America.  The 
largest overseas deployment of Venezuelan forces in its 
history occurred in 1990 (702 soldiers and 20 military 
observers) to support the United Nations Observer Group in 
Central America.38 
In summary, United States-Venezuelan strategic 
interests no longer evolve around the fight against 
communism.  Ideologically based historic interests like 
                     
37 Plan de Gobierno, http://www.venezuela.gov.ve/mainhechos.html, [08 Mar 
2001]. 
38 Romero, Carlos, “Exporting Peace be Other Means:  Venezuela,” in Jorge 
Dominguez, eds.  International Security and Democracy:  Lain America and the 
Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998, p. 
160. 
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nonintervention, opposition to sanctions, and human rights 
have moved up the priority list in Venezuelan foreign 
policy and are sources of disagreement.  Likewise, economic 
issues such as development and the FTAA are also seen from 
different perspectives.  Again, many of these views existed 
prior to 1989 but were relatively unimportant in the 
context of the Cold War. 
The end of the Cold War has given Venezuela more 
autonomy in its foreign policy.  While this explains why 
diversification of allies on the part of Venezuela is 
possible it does not answer why Venezuela has stopped 
seeking to strengthen links with the United States.  All 
countries in Latin America faced the same new international 
environment yet most have reinforced relations with the 
United States (except Cuba and possibly Brazil) while 
expanding their allies abroad.  The end of the Cold War is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition to explain 
Venezuela’s shift in foreign policy. 
B. ASYMETRICAL INTERDEPENDENCE 
The discovery of oil in the early 20th century 
integrated Venezuela into the world economy and cemented a 
relationship with the United States that remains to this 
day.  Petroleum linked Venezuela to the United States like 
no other Latin American country.  The United States has 
been the origin of cultural (Venezuela’s most popular sport 
is baseball), financial (85 percent of Venezuela’s foreign 
debt is owed to U.S. creditors), and economic (U.S. is 
number one trading partner) bonds.  Venezuela is 
reexamining this interdependent relationship in the context 
of the new post-Cold War international environment. 
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International relations theory explains Venezuela’s 
reduced emphasis on the United States.  Keohane and Nye 
define interdependence as “situations characterized by 
reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in 
different countries.”39  They stress that the definition is 
not limited to “situations of mutual benefit.”40  Currently, 
the main advantage for Venezuela in this interdependent 
relationship is the large petroleum market in the United 
States. 
There are a number of disadvantages in the economic 
relationship.  Venezuela is not competitive in the United 
States market for two primary reasons.  First, the Bolivar 
is overvalued and this causes exports to be expensive and 
noncompetitive in the overseas markets.  Second, 
Venezuela’s export economy is geared towards petroleum and 
other primary products like aluminum and steel.  This has 
resulted in the near extinction of the agriculture and 
manufacturing sectors geared to exports. 
The economic relationship between the two countries is 
also asymmetrical because exports to the United States are 
almost all primary products but imports from the United 
States are mostly manufactured goods.  Venezuela is at a 
disadvantage because there is less value added to primary 
products than manufactured goods. Additionally, 
manufactured goods are not subject to the extreme price 
swings associated with natural resources.  Another aspect 
of the asymmetry is the percentage of trade accounted for 
by Venezuela to the United States.  In 2000, United States 
imports from Venezuela accounted for just 1.53 percent of 
                     
39 Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph, Power and Interdependence:  World 
Politics in Transition, Little, Brown and Company Limited, 1977, p. 8. 
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total imports.41  Exports to Venezuela accounted for 3.18 
percent of the U.S. total in the same year.42 
Asymmetrical relationships like the United States and 
Venezuela have the potential for unequal gains that may 
result in a response by the weaker nation to distance 
itself from its partner (disintegration or fragmentation).  
“In cases where two political units have achieved a high 
level of formal political or economic integration and one 
subsequently attempts to establish increased autonomy, 
disintegration is the result.”43  Further:  “Political or 
economic integration should not be expected to occur, 
moreover, where there is a basic asymmetry on the pattern 
of transactions and in expected economic gains between the 
parties.” 44  As discussed in chapter two, during the 1990s 
Venezuela’s imports from the United States grew by 74.2 
percent while exports to the United States increased just 
18.9 percent.  A free trade agreement between the two 
countries would benefit the United States because Venezuela 
business and manufacturing is not competitive with its 
northern counterparts with the exception of aluminum, 
petroleum, and steel.  This type of agreement would cause 
the disappearance of noncompetitive domestic producers 
because their trade protection and state subsidies would in 
theory be eliminated. 
                     
40 Keohane and Nye, p. 9. 
41 “United States, Importing Country Venezuela:  Value Share”, Module to 
Explore and Review International Trade Statistics (MERIT) website, 
http://200.38.33.143/merits/, [01 Jun 2001]. 
42 “United States, Exporting Country Venezuela:  Value Share”, Module to 
Explore and Review International Trade Statistics (MERIT) website, 
http://200.38.33.143/merits/, [01 Jun 2001] 
43 Holsti K.J., p. 24. 
44 Holsti K.J., p. 32. 
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 This asymmetrical relationship also extends to 
political and military areas.  K.J. Holsti lists the 
following as expected policies by the weaker country in 
asymmetrical interdependence: 
1.  Terminate practices of joint policymaking, 
problem solving, or policy coordination; they may 
also withdraw support from, reduce participation 
in, institutions having supranational 
characteristics. 
2.  Alter asymmetrical relationships by 
significantly diversifying external contacts, 
building regional coalitions, or entering into 
regional integration schemes as a way of escaping 
domination by a hegemon.  
3.  Resist further integration but not seek to 
disintegrate or secede.45 
Venezuela has used many of these tactics in its quest 
to get out of its asymmetrical relationship with the giant 
to the north. 
In joint problem solving, Venezuela has distanced 
itself or shown opposition to United States influence in 
the region.  Venezuela is against Plan Columbia and refuses 
to coordinate with the United States on this issue.  
Overflight requests for United States aircraft have been 
continuously denied since 1994. 
Regional integration and non-hemispheric links have 
become an important focus over the last decade.  President 
Caldera (1994-1999) made Brazil his number one foreign 
policy issue and increasingly looked to Asia and the EU to 
expand trade.  The Chávez administration is focusing on 
four regions for increased integration, the Andean 
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Community, MERCOSUR, CARICOM, and the EU.  Venezuela has 
positioned itself well in Central America and the Caribbean 
by the 2000 signing of a preferential petroleum agreement.  
Under this agreement Venezuela offers up to 80,000 barrels 
of oil per day (bpd) to the 12 signatory nations.  Should 
each country import the maximum amount Venezuela’s exports 
would total 960,000 bpd (the United States imported 1.26 
million bpd in 2000).  The groundwork has been laid for 
this region to rival the United States in export share.  
Venezuela is also seeking to enter MERCOSUR in hopes that 
by growing MERCOSUR into a South America Free Trade Zone a 
counterweight to NAFTA can be created that will increase 
bargaining power in an eventual FTAA Agreement. 
In the Chávez administration’s economic plan the 
United States is conspicuous by its absence.  Venezuela is 
not pursing further economic integration with the United 
States. 
Asymmetrical interdependence explains Venezuela’s 
shift in foreign policy away from the United States because 
Venezuela fears increased integration will be harmful to 
its long-term economic interests.  How successful has the 
policy been? So far, the policy has flourished.  Venezuela 
has increased petroleum exports to the United States since 
1994 (Figure 1) and has also opened up new markets for both 
petroleum and non-petroleum exports.  For example, trade 
with the Caribbean Region increased 32 percent between 
1994-1999.46 
                     
45 Holsti, p.p. 33-34. 
46 SICE. 



































Figure 3. Crude Oil and Petroleum Imports 1990-2000 
(thousands of bpd) 
From:  “Table S3:  Crude Oil and Petroleum Product Imports, 




C. IMPACT OF THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 
Another important factor in the post-Cold War is the 
near worldwide acceptance of neoliberal economics.  This 
new model is commonly referred to as the Washington 
Consensus.  The main principles of this model are:  the 
opening up of a country to the world economy through trade 
liberalization, the reduction of government intervention, 
privatization, fiscal discipline, tax reform, making the 
private sector the engine of growth through deregulation 
and financial liberalization, and easier access to foreign 
direct investment.47  Another key tenet is that market 
forces rule the world and the days of import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) are over. 
                     
47 Rodrick, Dani, “Understanding Economic Policy Reform,” in Jeffry Frieden, 
Manuel Pastor, and Michael Tomz, eds. Modern Political Economy and Latin 
America, Westview Press, 2000, p. 63. 
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These new forces reduce the economic and development 
options available to nations.  It is argued if countries do 
not heed market forces they will face capital withdrawal 
and the denial of further credit by international financial 
institutions.  Embracing liberalization is suppose to lead 
to new exports opportunities as inefficiencies are rooted 
out of the economy and the market determines what the 
country should produce. 
Venezuela embraced the Washington consensus in 1989 
but after a disastrous outcome reversed course.  Venezuela 
has twice flirted with reform (1989, 1996) and both times 
returned to a state model of development while leaving some 
aspects of the reforms in place. Common justifications for 
implementing the Washington consensus are the support it 
receives from the International Monterey Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank, the success of the Asian Tigers, a way out of 
economic crisis, and a conduit to increase trade.48  
Venezuela’s experience with the Washington consensus 
follows, including what motivated the country to reform and 
the impact this has had on relations with the United 
States. 
1.  Venezuela’s Economic Model and History Of 
Reforms 
Venezuela’s economic development pattern of ISI was 
not seriously challenged until 1989.  The ISI model focused 
on using petroleum revenues to subsidize local industries, 
preserve an overvalued exchange rate, maintain low 
inflation, grow the economy, and co-opt opposition forces.  
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The central state served as the supervisor and dispenser of 
oil monies.  Since the first reforms in 1983, Venezuela has 
seen economic reform and statist policies alternate back 
and forth with the rise and fall of oil prices.  This 
eclectic policy has caused apprehension in Washington and 
even opposition “to the Venezuelan pattern of state 
management of the economy.”49 
The first attempt at reform came about due to 
international factors.  The Luis Herrera Campins (1978-83) 
administration devalued the Bolivar on February 18, 1983 in 
response to a foreign exchange crisis due to the Mexican 
default of 1982.  The Jaime Lusinchi (1983-1988) government 
put in a differentiated exchange rate that reduced the 
effectiveness of devaluing the Bolivar.  He also sustained 
the populist ISI model and no changes were made in economic 
policy.  Government spending increased while oil prices 
declined.  The result was when Carlos Andres Perez took 
office in 1989 he inherited a bankrupt state; total 
external debt was just over $29 billion.50 
Upon assuming office Perez immediately implemented a 
textbook case of the Washington consensus called El Gran 
Viraje (The Great Turnaround).  These reforms included the 
lifting of price controls, exchange-rate controls, a value 
added tax, renegotiating the country’s debt, tightening 
fiscal policy, liberalizing trade, and privatization. 
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On a macro-economic level the results were 
encouraging.  By 1990 inflation was down from 80 percent to 
31 percent.  GDP growth was 9.2 percent and unemployment 
fell to 7.5 percent.  However, the domestic reaction to the 
new economic policies was volatile.  Shortly after the 
reforms began riots occurred in Caracas and in 1992 two 
coup attempts occurred.  The impeachment of President Perez 
in 1993 froze reform efforts. 
In the 1994 election Rafael Caldera ran on a campaign 
of opposition to the economic reforms and “a return to the 
days of the interventionist state.”51  Upon assumption of 
office Caldera immediately overturned many reforms.  For 
example, he abolished the value added tax on the first day 
of the new administration.52  A banking crisis led to more 
severe economic problems in late 1994.  This crisis 
resulted in a second round of economic reforms in 1996.  
Price controls were again removed, privatization restarted, 
a wholesale and luxury tax replaced the extinct value added 
tax, and a crawling-peg exchange rate was implemented.  The 
failure of this reform was attributed to government 
increasing public spending as oil prices rose and income 
came in from privatization. 
In summary, both external shocks and internal events 
have motivated Venezuela to look to neoliberal economic 
reform.  These reforms have been implemented as a last 
resort but are quickly reversed when oil revenues increase.  
Why does Venezuela see this model as counterproductive? 
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2. The Washington Consensus as an Option 
The Washington Consensus runs counter to Venezuela’s 
current and historic development plan, sowing the oil.  
According to this popular plan, revenues and comparative 
advantages in petroleum should be used to support 
government programs and other sectors of the economy.  In 
this way, oil revenues make ISI a viable path of 
development in Venezuela.  Why this plan is so widely 
supported is best explained at the domestic level (chapter 
IV). 
Reform has also been hard to sell in a country where 
people are used to goods and money being doled out by the 
state and the populace believes the state, and therefore by 
association the citizen, is rich.  Venezuela is a rentier 
state, political authority rests on the capacity “to 
extract rents externally from the global environment and 
subsequently to distribute these revenues internally.”53  In 
1981, the government employed 24.4 percent of the 
workforce.54  The negative reaction to El Gran Viraje was in 
great part due to the belief by society that such draconian 
reforms were uncalled for in wealthy Venezuela. 
Reforms have not only reduced government employment 
but have had a negative impact on the bulk of society.  In 
1996, GDP per capita had dropped below the 1966 level (in 
1990 dollars).55  It is clear that the economic shock from 
the 1989 reform is responsible for some of these outcomes. 
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In summary, domestic factors associated with petroleum 
and the fact that reform has never been allowed to run its 
course has resulted in the Washington consensus being 
rejected as a development model. 
3. Oil-Based Economic Independence 
Oil was the vehicle used to delay neoliberal economic 
reforms in the 1980s and is still used to purse ISI 
policies in 2001.  This natural resource allows Venezuela 
leeway in its dealings with the international financial 
system in capital accumulation. 
Oil gives Venezuela the advantage of a positive trade 
balance and large international reserves.  In 2000, the 
trade balance was the largest in Latin America at $13.9 
billion (the next closest and only other positive was 
Ecuador with $750 million).56  Venezuela also has large 
international reserves, $15.9 billion or 14.4 months of 
imports in 2000.57  These reserves and positive trade 
balance cushion Venezuela’s economy from both international 
lending institutions and private sources of foreign direct 
investment.  Additionally, this surplus in reserves gives 
Venezuela more flexibility in its overall economic 
policies, allow it to maintain a band on its currency, and 
reduced external debt down to $20.2 billion as of year-end 
2000.58  All of these aspects reduce the incentives for 
Venezuela to adopt the new paradigm. 
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Notwithstanding this ability, both the Venezuelan 
financial institutions and government continue to court 
foreign investors.  However, the Chávez administration 
views world-lending institutions such as the IMF as 
counterproductive to development but cooperation with the 
World Bank continues.  Involvement with the World Bank 
continues due to the social nature of its programs. 
In summary, “Black Gold” allows Venezuela greater 
autonomy from the Washington consensus.  While it is clear 
oil permits Venezuela’s economic independence it does not 
explain why economic reform has been pursued and then 
neglected.  Who decided that neoliberal reform was harmful 
to the interests of Venezuela?  These answers are also 
found at the domestic level. 
D. UNITED STATES POLICIES TOWARD VENEZUELA 
Washington’s policies towards Venezuela could supply a 
parsimonious explanation for Venezuela’s disregard of the 
United States.  This section will determine if the path 
Venezuela is pursing is in fact due to unpopular policies 
on the part the United States. 
Since 1980, Venezuela has viewed critically unilateral 
military actions by the United States in the hemisphere.  
These include United States military actions in Grenada, 
Haiti, Panama, and Colombia.  This attitude continues as is 
evidenced by Venezuelan opposition to plan Colombia and 
cooperation in other aspects of the drug war.  In the 
Millennial Summit of the Americas and the 2000 Latin 
American Presidential Summit in Brazil, Chávez 
characterized Plan Colombia as the “Vietnamization” of the 
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Colombian conflict.59  Despite differences of how to proceed 
relations have stayed cordial around these issues. 
The most threatening issues Venezuela sees from its 
neighbor to the north are in the economic sphere.  The 
United States has tried to use non-tariff barriers (dumping 
or environmental standards accusations) to restrict 
Venezuelan gas, steel, and aluminum exports.60  In all 
cases, Venezuela has appealed to the WTO and won.  It 
should be noted that Venezuela also maintains non-tariff 
barriers on U.S. products.  For example oranges and poultry 
products are forbidden from imports because of “diseases” 
in the market of origin. 
In summary, United States policy towards Venezuela has 
not changed significantly over the last twenty years.  The 
country is treated as a friend and ally.  Venezuela has 
been able to resolve unpopular or unfair policies and has 
never suffered “any major military, diplomatic, or economic 
sanctions by the United States.”61  Notwithstanding their 
occasional unpopularity, regional and bilateral policies 
dictated from Washington do not explain Venezuela’s current 
posture in its relations with the United States. 
E. INTERNATIONAL CAUSES, NECESSARY OR SUFFICIENT? 
The end of the Cold War provides a parsimous 
explanation of why Venezuela is pursuing a more diversified 
foreign policy.  However, while definitely a necessary 
condition it is not sufficient.  All Latin American 
countries were faced with the same situation and many 
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diversified allies while maintaining or even strengthening 
their relationships with the United States. 
The desire to extract itself from an asymmetrical 
relationship with the United States is also a valid 
argument.  The question that arises is why now.  The end of 
the Cold War allows for the shift but does not explain the 
timing.  As noted in chapter two most evidence indicates 
1994 as the date Venezuela began its more autonomous 
foreign policy.  This corresponds to the reversal of the 
neoliberal economic paradigm, not the end of the Cold War. 
Venezuela’s focus on sowing the oil (ISI) is at odds 
with the Washington consensus.  Caracas sees the new 
economic model and the FTAA as an economic threat.  On the 
other side, Washington views Venezuela’s development model 
apprehensively.  It is clear that the Venezuela economy as 
currently constituted is highly threatened by neoliberal 
economic reform.  The partner most demanding for reform is 
the United States so it makes sense that Venezuela would 
look to other countries for economic growth.  So why did 
Venezuela conduct such a rapid, widespread reform in 1989?  
It was noted that the pressures for reform come form four 
sources; world-lending institutions, demonstration effect, 
to solve economic crisis, and to increase trade.  In the 
Venezuelan case, the two major economic reforms were in 
response to economic disasters (1989 bankrupt state and 
1994 banking crisis).  These reforms and the driving 
domestic forces behind their formation and setback will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
Unpopular United States policies towards Venezuela or 
Latin America do not offer much explanatory power.  It is 
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true that there have been disputes over interests that are 
considerable to Venezuela (oil, aluminum, and steel) but 
these have been peacefully resolved using the WTO.  Before 
1994, Venezuela was often opposed to United States policies 
in Latin America yet did not reduce its focus on its 
largest trading partner.  Like so many other international 
factors, this aspect has some value but is not a causal 
variable to explain the different path Venezuela is 
pursing.  This is important because it means the change in 
the relationship is not a failure of United States policy, 
but it also makes improving the bilateral relationship more 
difficult. 
Overall, Venezuela has reacted differently towards the 
United States in the new international environment than the 
rest of Latin America (except possibly Brazil and Cuba).  
The end of the Cold War and Venezuela’s economic 
independence explain why Venezuela was able to purse a more 
autonomous foreign policy (permits the change) and 
asymmetrical interdependence explains Venezuela’s reasons 
for wanting to pursue this policy over others.  The most 
important asymmetry is in economics with Venezuela 
rejecting the Washington consensus in favor of ISI.  This 
chapter argued neoliberal economics was rejected due to 
economic independence (oil reduced importance on 
international capital) but were there other motivations?  
The next chapter will look at why reforms failed and why 
subsequent politicians have opted for the no-reform route. 
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IV. DOMESTIC FACTORS:  POLITICS AND THE ECONOMY 
The previous chapter established that at the 
international level Venezuela sees increased economic 
integration with the United States as a threat to its 
economic interests.  Venezuela’s rejection of economic 
reform and continual pursuit of ISI is due to domestic 
factors.  The two main domestic issues over the last twenty 
years have been the changes in politic parties and a dismal 
economy.  This chapter will discuss these two variables and 
investigate if foreign policy is subordinated to the needs 
of the domestic regime.  In 1994, President Caldera made a 
decision to reverse economic reforms to placate interest 
groups.  What led to this policy choice, what groups were 
pacified, and is this the proximate cause for the shift in 
foreign policy? 
After a brief discussion of the theoretical framework 
the chapter will give an overview of what has happened in 
politics since the restoration of democracy in 1958.    
Venezuela’s two prominent political parties quickly began 
to lose power after the 1993 impeachment of President 
Pérez.  This is also when policies towards the United 
States began to change.  Politics, economics, and actors 
all aided in the downfall of Pérez. 
A political economy approach will be used in this 
analysis.  This method uses the policy preferences of 
individual actors, how they form into groups that can 
influence politics, how these groups seek to obtain 
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policies favorable to them in the context of the existing 
institutions, and the outcome these groups have on policy.62 
There are a number of significant actors in Venezuela 
including political parties, business capitalists, middle-
class professionals, labor unions, the Catholic Church, the 
military, and neighborhood associations.  The interests of 
the political parties are to consolidate power and maximize 
profit. Business, professionals, and labor unions all seek 
to increase their economic utility.  The Church and 
military seek to maintain an influence in society and 
continue existing as organizations.  Neighborhood 
associations aim to maximize economic benefits for their 
respective communities. 
In his study of 330 government consultative 
commissions from February 1959 to December 1989, Brian 
Crisp puts these actors into four broad groups: government 
officials, representatives of economic interest groups or 
socioeconomic sectors, representatives of non-economic 
interest groups or institutions, and undefined 
participants.63  He argues that by addressing who takes part 
in these commissions we can gain a greater understanding of 
who and what, apart from elections, pressure political 
decisions in Venezuela.64  During this 30-year period, 1,856 
government officials, 1,016 representatives of economic 
groups, 195 representatives of noneconomic groups, and 208 
unclassifiable participants played a role in government 
policy via these commissions.65  Only 29 members of the 
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noneconomic group were from the Church and military.66  The 
economic group consists of private capitalists, middle-
class professionals, and organized labor.  Of these three, 
only capitalists and labor are organized across the country 
and are recognized by the government.  Only these two 
groups were granted a legalistic role in influencing 
government policy. 
Based on this evidence, it is clear that historically 
the most influential groups in the country are the business 
capitalists, labor, and the political parties.  
Specifically, these actors are the Federación de Cámaras y 
Asociaciones de Comercio y Producción (Federation of 
Chambers and Associations of Commerce and 
Production/FEDECAMARAS), Confederación de Trabajadores de 
Venezuela (Confederation of Venezuelan Workers/CTV), Acci?n 
Democrática (Democratic Action Party/AD), and Comité de 
Organización Política Electoral Independiente (Committee of 
Independent Electoral Political Organization/COPEI).  Under 
AD administrations commissions consisted of 62 percent 
government officials, 14 percent capitalists, and eight 
percent labor.  Under COPEI the percentage breakdown was 
48, 17, and eight respectively.67  In this corporatist 
arrangement, these three groups made up roughly 80 percent 
of all participants on consultative commissions and 
governing boards of public-law agencies.68 
The strategic context that allowed these two 
nongovernmental groups to attain quasi government status 
was the Pact of Punto Fijo.  Business and labor were given 
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legal status in decision-making in this 1958 pacted 
transition to democracy (discussed in more detail in the 
next section).69 
The outcome was that consultation with FEDECAMARAS and 
CTV occurred prior to government action in virtually every 
area of policy making.  These groups were much more than 
lobbyists; they become an institutionalized part of the 
government decision-making process.  As described in this 
chapter, the overall effect of this was a rigid government 
less responsive to voters, enrichment of these interests 
groups, an asymmetrical distribution of public goods, and 
economic malaise.  All of these issues came to a head in 
1989 when President Pérez did not include his own or 
opposition parties, CTV, FEDECAMARAS, or the public in the 
economic reform process.  This ultimately led to a 
breakdown in the political system and a reversal of 
reforms.  After Pérez both the Washington consensus and 
mainstream politicians were discredited.  This demise has 
its roots in the 1958 transition to democracy. 
A. MODEL DEMOCRACY OR FORMULA FOR DISASTER? 
Venezuela was long considered one of, if not the most, 
successful democracy in Latin America.  From 1958 until 
1994 two political parties were able to maintain a hold on 
politics in the country.  This two party system was seen as 
an exemplar for other countries in the region.  The two 
parties penetrated all aspects of the state and were seen 
as the only game in town at the national level.  
Transitions of power were not only bloodless but also 
peaceful.  The 1990s not only saw the rise of ex-coup 
leader Hugo Chávez to the presidency but also a complete 
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shake up of political parties.  The evaporation of the two 
main parties has come as a shock to many scholars of the 
region. 
The overall collapse of AD and COPEI can be attributed 
to the fact that both lost the support of an overwhelming 
majority of the Venezuelan people.  It is obvious that 
without a loyal electorate it is nearly impossible for 
parties to remain in power.  What is not so clear are the 
factors that were the basis for the loss of devotion to AD 
and COPEI.  This lack of support came about due to four 
factors:  1) Systemic problems caused by the Pact of Punto 
Fijo.  Specifically, how the relationship set up between 
the parties and interest group penetration hindered 
democracy.  2) An increasing perception of corruption 
within and around the polity.  3) The parties’ inability to 
provide social goods to the electorate and meet the demands 
of elite actors.  4) Deteriorating economic conditions. 
All of the above provided an environment ripe for 
change.  Any politician that was seen as being against the 
traditional parties, economic reform, and corruption was 
bound to prosper.  Rafael Caldera, one of the founders of 
the Pact of Punto Fijo, won the elections in 1993 by 
running as an independent on precisely this platform.  The 
2000 elections only proved how politically unpopular AD and 
COPEI had become as neither party was able to endorse a 
candidate for president.  Thus the elections of 1993 saw a 
sea change in Venezuelan politics and economics.  The 
founding political pact was dead and the neoliberal reforms 
of 1989 were at a nadir. 
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1. The Impact Of the Pact of Punto Fijo 
Venezuela saw a successful three-year run at democracy 
from 1945 to 1948 that ended with military intervention.  
AD partly blamed their loss of power in not having the 
support of the other parties.  The late 1950s again brought 
an opportunity for another fledgling democracy to form.  In 
order to establish a viable democracy, the three major 
parties met and signed the Pact of Punto Fijo agreement in 
October 1958.  Although the formal alliance ended with 
Rafael Caldera’s victory in the 1968 election the spirit of 
the agreement remained the basis for politics for another 
25 years.70 
The agreement bound the signatories, AD, COPEI, and 
Unión Republicana Democrática (Venezuelan Republican 
Democratic Party/URD), to respect the results of the 1958 
elections, defend the right of the winning party to rule, 
form a government of national unity, and enact a minimum 
program of governance.  FEDECAMARAS and CTV, established in 
the late 1940s, also signed the agreement and were thereby 
institutionalized into the system.  This agreement was very 
relevant for the situation in which the Venezuelan 
democracy was in at the time.  The pact presented a united 
front within the democratic parties and society against 
authoritarianism and communism.  This agreement influenced 
Venezuelan politics for the next 40 years.  The strengths 
and weaknesses of the pact in great part helped lead to the 
downfall of its signers. 
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The most beneficial result of the agreement was that 
strong parties were able to emerge and be consolidated.  
This occurred in part because of the sharing of power.  
Even in a loss the loser would have some representation in 
the government.  This guaranteed not only a long life for 
the parties but access to the great oil coffers of the 
state in financing both parties.  These riches allowed for 
some of the most costly campaigns in Latin America.  In 
1988, the two major parties are estimated to have spent $69 
million each on their campaigns.71  This access to and 
control over state money also caused popular support for AD 
and COPEI, with the voter’s aim being to receive material 
benefits for their loyalty.  In fact, some individuals were 
card-carrying members of both parties. 
There was also an active effort by the parties to 
incorporate key groups in society.  According to Karl, 
“Venezuela’s democracy was based on public policies and 
state expenditures aimed at winning the political support 
of every major organized class or social group.”72  Oil 
revenues allowed the political institutions to organize-in 
party officials, organized labor, and big capital.  
Business and labor, embodied in FEDECAMARAS and CTV 
respectively, had privileged access to Venezuelan 
presidents and used this to influence policy outcomes.73 
For example, in 1966 the CTV-controlled Venezuelan 
Workers’ Bank (BTV) was created.  Government deposits 
ranged form 49.6 percent to 89.4 percent of its funding.74  
“The BTV created a number of enterprises and established a 
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virtual financial empire under the control of the CTV.”75 
FEDECAMARAS also directly benefited from its association 
with the government.  In 1984, FEDECAMARAS positioned 
itself as the only capital representative on the National 
Commission of Costs, Prices, and Salaries.  The commission 
was originally formed to put a ceiling on prices of basic 
commodities but because of FEDECAMARAS just the opposite 
happened.76 
Stringent party discipline was the norm for AD and 
COPEI.  Politics in Venezuela was institutionalized 
following the Weberian tradition with the parties having 
professional staffs and a high degree of penetration.  Over 
time both parties made important linkages into civil 
society including labor unions, student groups, and 
professional associations; these links were evident in 
almost every city in the country.  The extent of the reach 
of AD and COPEI was demonstrated by a study which concluded 
that party members accounted for 50 percent of the 
population over age 15. 
URD shows just how important it was to have a 
disciplined party. URD garnered 26 percent of the vote in 
the 1958 presidential elections but less than ten years 
later was extinct. Kornblithe and Levine argue that Jovita 
Villalba’s personalistic control of URD made organizational 
consolidation impossible: promising cadres were repeatedly 
driven out, and opportunities to build a durable party 
structure were wasted.77 
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The negative aspects of the Pact of Punto Fijo became 
systemic problems for politics in Venezuela and included 
the strangle hold by AD and COPEI over politics, the highly 
structured nature of the parties, and access to state 
resources for parties, labor, and business.  In not 
addressing these problems through effective political 
reform, a disenchantment of the electorate and a 
pessimistic view towards AD and COPEI developed.  Although 
economic and other pressures were intense, the failure of 
the parties to reform themselves was the main reason for 
their collapse. 
Perhaps the biggest drawback to the Pact of Punto Fijo 
was its exclusion of the Communist Party and the lack of 
provisions for integrating new parties and interest groups.  
This agreement regulated who had access to power (and by 
control of the state to oil spoils) and who could influence 
those in power.  These rules first established and then 
reproduced the entitlements of AD, COPEI, organized labor 
(CTV), and the capitalist class (FEDECAMARAS), solidifying 
these interests in a new status quo.  This limited the 
voters’ choices and privileged the elites associated with 
the original agreement (FEDECAMARAS and CTV).  It was only 
after limited political reform in the mid 1980s that state 
and local elections were held for the first time on 
December 3, 1989.  Although some progress was made at the 
local level national elections continued to be dominated by 
AD and COPEI until 1993 (Figure 1). 
The fact that politicians who did not toe the party 
line were expelled did not help promote change.  AD and 
COPEI were highly structured and “were therefore more 
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insulated from their environment and more homogeneous in 
nature because subunits were under the direct control of 
hierarchical authority.  Internal pluralism and factions 
were not allowed, giving the party organization a 
monolithic character.”78  Both parties were very slow in 
reacting to external influences and in reforming the 
parties to make a better democracy.  One example of the 
slowness of reform was the closed list system and control 
over governor and other local appointments until the late 
1980s.  Another example was the business as usual attitude 
after the 27 February 1989 (27F) riots, triggered by a 
price increase of gasoline decreed by President Pérez. 
Because of the unlimited access of the parties to the 
wealth of the state, political parties became informally 
privatized and lost their desire to represent the needs of 
the electorate.  The Pact of Punto Fijo created a democracy 
“designed institutionally to accommodate the domestic 
business and labor interests that were part of an inward-
oriented development strategy.”79  This ISI strategy 
supported by FEDECAMARAS and CTV used government funds and 
protection to assure investment opportunities, profits, 
jobs, and wages.80  Up until 1989, oil booms and economic 
reforms brought new government policies heavily influenced 
by and greatly favoring these groups.  More money also 
brought increased public perception of corruption and 
demands for change.  The government budget nearly tripled 
in the 1973-74 oil boom and doubled in the 1979-81 boom.81  
In 1981 the government employed 24.4 percent of the 
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workforce.82  As Venezuelan society changed, the polity did 
not alter political access or the economic development plan 
despite criticism from the electorate and those not 
benefiting from oil proceeds. 
The Lusinchi (1983-1988) administration tried to quell 
neoliberal and popular criticism of politics in Venezuela 
through the Commission for Political Reform (COPRE).  COPRE 
sought to move decision-making to lower levels of 
government, decrease the role of parties in elections, and 
increase transparency in the internal workings of the 
parties.83  The results of this reform were limited but did 
achieve the direct election of governors, separation of the 
legislative and presidential ballot, and gave voters the 
right to indicate preferences among candidates on the 
lists.  However after 1989 opposition victories in key 
governorships, AD blocked further political change. 
The next round of political reforms was undertaken in 
late 1990 with the Pacto Para la Reforma (Pact for Reform) 
signed on December 4th of that year.  The document called 
for new electoral laws, the reorganization of the 
judiciary, the democratization of internal party affairs, 
and explicitly declared, “that the foundational pact of 
1958 had been exhausted.”84  Unfortunately this legislation 
ended up being all talk and no action.  After the February 
4, 1991 (4F) coup attempt reactionary reforms became the 
mode of operation for the government and the Pacto Para la 
Reforma was left in the shadows. 
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The fact that the parties recognized the need to form 
a new agreement about how politics should work in Venezuela 
shows that there was an awareness of the general 
dissatisfaction with the current political system.  Despite 
this recognition the parties were unable to implement the 
changes they agreed were necessary to prevent a breakdown. 
The 27F riots were the initial event that focused 
public scrutiny on politics; this was followed by two coups 
and the impeachment of President Pérez.  A January 1989 
poll showed that the most important political reform people 
expected from the new government was more direct 
participation.85  Just the opposite happened as President 
Pérez and a key group of technocrats implemented neoliberal 
economic reforms with little input from the electorate 
(including elites, politicians, unions, or business).  In 
an August 1993 poll, two-thirds of respondents viewed AD 
unfavorably and one-half viewed COPEI unfavorably. 
By 1994 Venezuela had reached a pivotal crossroads for 
AD and COPEI.  Between them the parties had only garnered 
45 percent of the presidential vote (Figure 1).  A founding 
member of COPEI, Rafael Caldera, had abandoned the party 
and won the presidency as an independent.  Felipe Aguero 
summed up one way for AD and COPEI to recover from this 
defeat.   “AD and COPEI could manage to retain their 
majority status in the party system but with more open 
internal politics (e.g., primaries and greater 
democratization of decision making).”86  Despite defeat and 
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the obvious need for reform, AD and COPIE continued to 
conduct politics as usual.  Their complete unpopularity 
with the public was demonstrated in the 1998 elections 
where together they received only 11 percent of the 
presidential vote (Figure 1).  In fact, it was a 
disadvantage for a candidate to be backed by AD or COPEI. 
Former Miss Universe Irene Saez was a favored candidate for 
the 1998 presidential elections but once she received the 
backing of COPEI her support evaporated.  The last minute 
agreement by AD and COPEI to join forces to prevent Chávez 
from being elected further proved to the average Venezuelan 
that there was no difference between AD and COPEI and they 
did not have the voters interests as their first priority.  
The political monopoly of AD and COPEI ended because of 
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Figure 4. AD and COPEI percentage share of presidential 
vote 1958-2000 
Sources:  1958-1993 data:  Crisp, p 45.  1998 & 2000 data:  
Consejo Nacional Electoral http://www.cne.gov.ve/. 
 
 
                     
Democracy Under Stress, University of Miami, 1995, p. 262. 
  58 
2. Corruption 
Venezuela is seen as a corrupt state both by the 
external world and the average Venezuelan citizen.  
Transparency International has consistently ranked it among 
the most corrupt countries in Latin America and the world.  
The 2000 survey ranked Venezuela as the 18th most corrupt 
country in the world.87  In dealing with corruption 
perceptions are just as important as reality.  The 
definition I will use for corruption is government 
officials or their allies using state resources for their 
personal enrichment.  Karl notes, “individual businessmen 
utilized the increased autonomy of the office of the chief 
executive in order to make the state an instrument of their 
private interests.”88  This is not something new in 
Venezuela, what is new is the public reaction to this 
graft. 
Corruption in Venezuela has a long and colorful 
history throughout the years of caudillos, dictators, and 
democratic leaders.  Caudillos took control of the 
government with the specific goal in mind to raid the state 
treasury.  After the rise to power of Rómulo Betancourt in 
1945 his administration put on trial more than 100 former 
government officials resulting in the repayment to the 
nation of over 400 million bolivars, more than an entire 
year’s national budget for the day.89 
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The end product of the Pact of Punto Fijo was a state 
that doled out money and contracts to the elites (mostly 
business and labor) and families associated with party 
leaders.  Even though corruption seemed to become more 
widespread as time passed, the negative effects were 
tempered by oil income.  Another important aspect of 
corruption in Venezuela is that there was little trickle-
down effect; it was basically a redistribution of wealth to 
the upper class. 
Corruption probably decreased after 1989 due to the 
dismantling of the highly corrupt Régimen de Cambio 
Diferenciales (Differential Exchange Rate Regime/RACADI) 
foreign exchange system (talked about more in detail in the 
economics section).  Despite the possibility that graft was 
declining public perception and intolerance actually 
increased.  This was most likely due to increased poverty 
rates, declining real wages, and the end of the oil boom. 
It was very hard for Venezuelans to deal with or even 
understand their declining wages and standard of living in 
what they perceived to be a wealthy state.  It was much 
easier to make corruption the scapegoat for all their 
economic woes.  On top of this were government pleas to 
make economic sacrifices in the name of economic reform.  
Yet at the same time the public continued to hear about 
corruption scandals in politics and throughout society.  
While the average Venezuelan could not afford basic 
medicines, lived in a neighborhood with no piped water, and 
struggled to find enough to eat, politicians and their 
friends called on everyone to make sacrifices, but rode in 
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imported luxury automobiles.90  To add insult to injury the 
cases of corruption that were documented rarely resulted in 
convictions, with the perpetrator usually ending up in 
Miami with his money. 
Oil was literally the lubricant that allowed 
corruption to exist and flourish in Venezuela.  Until the 
early 1980s, there was so much wealth in the system money 
could be siphoned off at various levels with very little if 
any impact on the economy or working class.  The greater 
part of the additional income remained in the hands of the 
richest 20 percent, with a small trickle-down effect that 
benefited only the next quintile.91  Unfortunately, with the 
declining oil prices of the 1980s the system came under 
pressure.  Graft continued, but at the expense of the 
economy and the average Venezuelan. 
Controlling corruption was and is seen as the 
responsibility of the government and was a key 
justification for the two coups attempts in 1991.  This 
author witnessed the February 4th coup and the 
demonstrations that followed.  The main claim for wanting 
President Pérez out of office was corruption.  In fact, the 
president acknowledged he was corrupt.  I witnessed a 
speech by Pérez while living in Venezuela.  In the funeral 
of the members of his Honor Guard killed in the attack on 
the presidential residence he stated, “I know that I am 
corrupt but this government is corrupt from top to bottom 
and I can not be blamed for all of the problems.”  While 
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true, I was shocked to see a sitting president admit to 
being a crook. 
Even one of the most respected institutions in the 
country, the military, is plagued by corruption.  This 
author has personal experience with the corruption of the 
Venezuelan Guardia Nacional.  They detained me for 12 hours 
at a checkpoint outside Guanare because I was unwilling to 
bribe them.  As I sat there I saw how they “confiscated” 
food and other supplies from the vehicles that did not pay 
them off with money, alcohol, or cigarettes.  Hellinger’s 
conclusion is sad but accurate, “Corruption has spread to 
all levels of society.”92 
It is not surprising that Rogelio Pérez Perdomo 
concluded, “Corruption is regarded as one of the most 
serious threats to the functioning of the Venezuelan state 
and one of the principal destabilizing factors of the 
political system.”93  In fact, corruption would prove not 
only to be President Pérez’s Achilles heel, but also that 
of AD and COPEI.  Pérez was impeached for embezzlement of 
funds from the presidential discretionary account and both 
AD and COPEI were accused of being the overseers of a 
corrupt system. 
3. Consequences Of Not Providing the Goods to 
Society and the Elites 
A responsibility of any government is to provide 
adequate social policies for the development of the nation 
and its people.  In the words of Janet Kelley, “social 
policy should ensure the provision of public goods to all 
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members of society.”94  The declining price of oil and 
increasing economic woes of the 1980s led to a decline in 
the quality of social programs. A 1987 survey found that 
the wealthy had considerable advantages over the poor in 
medical attention, housing, and education.95  It is no 
coincidence that these are three areas in which the 
government is responsible for maintaining access and 
services. 
Despite economic reforms the government continued to 
pursue statist policies.  In 1990, 150,000 new government 
jobs were added to the already bloated Venezuelan 
administration.  Despite this huge bureaucracy and oil 
money not one public service (education, health, housing, 
transportation, etc.) functioned at even a minimum level of 
adequacy.  Not only did this lead to a feeling of exclusion 
on the part of persons no longer getting goods from these 
social programs, these failures in social policy also led 
to a serious weakening of the political system which 
crafted and implemented it. 
It is not the purpose of this section to go into 
detail about the many failings of the Venezuelan social 
system.  What is important is that neither AD or COPEI were 
able to resolve the problems with the institutions of the 
state.  This led to growing pessimism about politics in 
general and especially the ruling parties AD and COPEI. 
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President Pérez was able to implement the 1989 reforms 
because he launched the package without consulting CTV, 
FEDECAMARAS, or even his own party (AD).  Crisp notes, “had 
Pérez used the old policy-making mechanisms, a neoliberal 
package would not have been attempted because it lacked a 
mobilized constituency.”96  In fact, the 1989 reform was a 
direct threat to FEDECAMARAS and CTV interests as the 
government eliminated licenses and bans on 1,900 items 
accounting for 77 percent of manufactured imports and 
reduced tariffs.97  CTV reacted to this by calling for the 
first nationwide strike in its history against a government 
it had helped to elect.98 
The overall result of the 1989 reform was both 
Venezuelan elites and masses “were confronted with a 
renegade president”99 who changed the rules of the game in 
dividing the oil rents. 
4. The Economy 
In the case of Venezuela the proverbial “lost decade” 
of economic development has become a lost two decades.  
Venezuela had a -.1 percent yearly GDP growth rate form 
1990 to 1999 while Latin America as a region had a positive 
three percent growth rate.100  Venezuela’s economic 
performance from 1980 to the present in general has been 
very bad.  These economic problems are due to government 
mismanagement of the economy.  This is especially important 
when the public view is the government is responsible for 
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the economy.  This section will summarize the major 
economic problems and then analyze how these affected the 
majority of Venezuelans. 
In general, the rentier paradigm in the Venezuelan 
economy wasted resources.  Oil money allowed the government 
to subsidize and protect local industries.  This resulted 
in profit rates “among the highest in the world but also a 
vicious inflationary circle where tariff protection and 
continuing import substitution became increasingly 
expensive.”101 
Many of Venezuela’s economic problems can be traced to 
the 1970s when oil money was available to fund all kinds of 
government programs and maintain an overvalued exchange 
rate.  After the oil boom ended the government continued to 
spend as if nothing had changed.  The only way to maintain 
this spending was through borrowing abroad and running 
government deficits. 
The decline in oil prices in the 1980s without a 
similar decline in government spending resulted in 
government deficits.  These deficits were exacerbated by 
the RECADI system that was put in place in 1983 for the 
purpose of maintaining foreign reserves.  RECADI determined 
at what exchange rate individuals and private firms would 
repay foreign debt.  Importers and private firms (with 
party links) received preferential treatment by a 
government process that included interest group 
participation. RECADI was composed of three representatives 
from the executive, one from CTV, and one from 
FEDECAMARAS.102  The resulting corruption was a gigantic 
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eight billion dollars in fraudulent profits.103  “Anyone who 
could use bolivars to buy dollars at a preferential rate, 
often illicitly, could simply recycle the dollars back into 
bolivars at a higher rate a earn a tidy profit in the 
process.”104 
The public sector had the highest rate but even it was 
overvalued.  This resulted in an increase in imports but a 
decrease in non-oil exports.  In 1988 Venezuela, with four 
percent of Latin America’s population accounted for 10 
percent of its imports.  It is estimated that in 1988 the 
Bolivar was overvalued by 110 percent.105  In 1988 Venezuela 
also saw its first trade deficit since 1978.  This deficit 
allowed Venezuela to largely maintain the standard of 
living of its citizens.  However, sooner or later the debts 
would have to be paid. 
Under Pérez the government attempted to address the 
economic woes it was facing and implemented a neoliberal 
economic policy.  This consisted of macroeconomic 
stabilization, trade liberalization, deregulation, 
privatization, foreign investment promotion, austerity 
measures, and social programs targeted at the most needy.  
He abandoned the process of consulting with the political 
parties, FEDECAMARAS, and CTV because they favored the 
status quo. 
The deep economic crisis of the country, a changing 
international economic context, and a changing domestic 
social structure led to the reform.  Basically, Pérez 
inherited a bankrupt state from his predecessor.  The 
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country had a net capital loss of $17.3 billion between 
1983 and 1987.  In 1986, 75 percent of government revenue 
so important for subsidizing CTV and FEDECAMARAS was going 
to service the public debt.106  In 1988 government spending 
increased 9.9 percent while revenue fell 4 percent, 
resulting in a deficit of 9.4 percent of GDP.107 
In reaction to this, the president cut spending but 
did it in areas that would not be immediately noticed.  At 
the same time the social safety net for the poorest of the 
poor was strengthened through things like the milk program 
for school-aged children.  On a macroeconomic scale 
President Pérez’s policies were successful.  The government 
deficit was only 1.1 percent of GDP in 1989 and 1991 and 
1992 saw surpluses of .2 and 1.3 percent respectively.  GDP 
growth in 1991 was 9.7 percent, one of the highest in the 
world.  However, the government cutbacks led to schools 
with teachers but without supplies or water, universities 
without laboratories, hospitals without medicine, 
government offices with no phones or typewriters, and 
public services without maintenance.  In 1991, the public 
service sector spending was only 42 percent of the 1982 
level.108  The impact on the populace was the emergence of a 
government that was unable to provide basic goods to the 
public. 
The liberalization reforms of 1989 also unleashed 
inflationary shocks to the economy.  The continued 
inflation affected the middle and lower classes more as 
they were unable to protect themselves by holding dollar 
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accounts or other assets like land or houses.  In a January 
1989 poll, 40 percent named controlling the cost of living 
as the most important policy area for implementation by the 
new government.109  Pérez promised to control inflation but 
failed.  Subsequent administrations also had trouble 
controlling inflation and in 1996 Venezuela experienced the 
highest inflation in its history (Figure 2).  Mostly due to 
inflation, wages have steadily declined in real terms since 
1978.  In 1996, per capita GDP in 1990 U.S. dollars was 































Figure 5. Venezuelan Inflation:  1981-2001 
From:  Banco Central de Venezuela, 
http://www.bcv.org.ve/. 
The economic reform initiated in 1989 was long 
overdue.  The reform was necessary not only to allow 
Venezuela to compete more effectively in the international 
arena but also to improve the internal health of the 
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economy.  Unfortunately, not enough effort was directed 
towards helping the shrinking middle class in coping with 
the economic changes.  Nor was an attempt made to include 
those groups that benefited from the reform process into 
the consultative process.  In summary, reform was not 
wrong; it just needed to be implemented in a way that 
better cushioned the middle class and allowed constituent 
input.  The results of the reform were a shrinking middle 
class, growing poverty, social protest, interest group 
pressure for reversal, and with the 1993 election of 
Caldera a reversal of reforms. 
The frustration with the parties that started during 
the 1980s was caused by the institutional setup of the 
political system.  Access was severely limited and change 
was slow.  The polity saw the 27F riots as an aberration 
and politics continued as usual.  President Pérez continued 
with his neoliberal economic reforms and on a macro scale 
they were successful.  However, the social programs were 
not sufficient and an increasing number of people faced a 
declining standard of living.  Interest groups and even AD 
were left out of the process.  It should come as no 
surprise that a January 1992 poll showed 82 percent of 
Venezuelans wanting a reform of political parties.111  This 
reform did not come, but change did. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The inflexibility of the two major parties in the face 
of the need to reform, increasing perception and 
intolerance of corruption, a broken social system, a lock 
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out of FEDECAMARAS and CTV in the 1989 reform, and a 
failing economy were just too much for the people to 
tolerate.  Based on my two-year experience of living in 
Venezuela from 1990 to 1992 I find Burggraaff’s and 
Millett’s assessment of the feelings and frustrations of 
the average Venezuelan very precise:  “Democratic 
institutions had lost their early dynamism and politics had 
lost touch with the average person.  Politicians were 
increasingly perceived as parasites on the body politic, 
lacking any incentive to reform a system that had provided 
them wealth, status, and power.”112  The impact of failure in 
the political, economic, social, and corruption spheres led 
to the eventual desertion of supporters from AD and COPEI 
and a general disenchantment with politics. 
This declining support was evident in many empirical 
studies and polls, and in voter apathy.  A 1992 poll showed 
44.4 percent of respondents disenchanted with AD and COPEI 
compared to 21.7 percent in 1989.113  Abstention rates 
continue to climb and reached their high in the 2000 
presidential elections where more than five out of ten 
voters did not participate in the presidential elections, 
the highest in Venezuelan history (Figure 3). 
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Figure 6. Venezuelan Voter Abstention (percent) in 
Presidential Elections 
From:  1958-1993 data Crisp p.177.  1998 & 2000 data:  
Consejo Nacional Electoral http://www.cne.gov.ve/. 
 
The traditional stranglehold of AD and COPEI over 
politics began to give way at the national level as parties 
like Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and La Causa R (Radical 
Cause Party) began to win more seats.  In 1988 AD and COPEI 
had 78 percent of the seats in the legislature.114  The 1993 
election saw a defeat in which together the two parties 
garnered only 45 percent of the presidential vote.  As 
noted previously, this dropped precipitously to 11 percent 
in 1998 and to zero in 2000.  Moreover, in 1993 both the 
Senate and the Chamber of Deputies (legislature) 
experienced a huge turnover.  Of the 52 seats in the Senate 
18 belonged to AD, 15 to COPEI, ten to Convergencia, and 
nine to MAS.  The legislature was composed of 55 seats for 
AD, 54 for COPEI, 24 for Convergencia, and 26 for MAS.115  AD 
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and COPEI saw their combined seats in the legislature drop 
to 55 percent.  The 1998 elections saw further decline with 
representation by these two parties in the legislature 
falling to less than one half of that body (89 seats out of 
189116, 47 percent).  The near death of AD and COPEI was 
evident in the 2000 elections where neither party ran a 
presidential candidate and the parties won only 36 seats in 
the 165 seat National Assembly (22 percent).117 
It should come as no surprise that these parties lost 
favor with the electorate.  AD and COPEI did nothing to 
reform their parties and were blamed for the economic woes, 
social failures, and rampant corruption in the country. 
The fact that Chávez won the 1998 elections had more 
to do with his platform of rejecting the traditional 
“oligarchic” parties and stressing change than any other 
factor.  Venezuela would have voted for anyone that 
promised change and was not associated with AD or COPEI. 
Chávez and his MVR (Movimiento Quinta República/Fifth 
Republic Movement) party are now in a similar situation to 
what AD and COPEI were in shortly after the Pact of Punto 
Fijo agreement.  Will MVR become a monolithic giant and 
just fill the void left by AD and COPEI?  Will the Chávez 
administration be able to reverse the corruption, economic 
sluggishness, and social woes of the country?  Theses 
questions are currently being played out on the stage of 
Venezuelan politics and will be looked at in the next 
chapter. 
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On the economic front Venezuela has experienced 
economic growth over the last two years in great part due 
to high oil prices.  In contrast, 1999 saw a –4.5 percent 
shrinkage in GDP.  It is estimated year-end 2001 inflation 
will be less than 12 percent (the lowest since 1983); the 
1994-1999 average was 50 percent.118  Chávez has also 
“declared war” on corruption and is attempting to 
revitalize funding for social programs through a tripling 
of non-oil tax revenues.  His responses to these challenges 
seem to be consistent with those of his predecessors. 
The last sentence of Gabriel García Márquez’s novel 
One Hundred Years of Solitude has a haunting warning 
appropriate for Venezuelan politicians.  It says, “Races 
condemned to one hundred years of solitude did not have a 
second opportunity on earth.”119  The message is clear; those 
politicians/parties who do not learn from the mistakes of 
the past (exclusion) do not have a future. 
The previous chapter established that Venezuela has 
reduced focus on the United States because increased 
economic integration with the U.S. is seen as a threat.  
This chapter explained why certain interest groups 
(politicians, FEDECAMARAS, CTV, the public) see neoliberal 
reform as harmful to their interests.  The simultaneous 
failure of economic reform and political reform only 
further discredited the Washington consensus and entrenched 
the view among politicians and the electorate that sowing 
the oil is the only alternative for development. 
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The fatal flaw in Venezuela’s political system was its 
rigidity.  In sum, Venezuelan society and world economic 
conditions changed.  A valid attempt at economic reform 
occurred by without real political reform it did not have 
much chance for success. The entrenchment of AD and COPEI 
in politics, and FEDECAMARAS and CTV in the consultative 
arena, helped those in power restrict the emergence of new 
groups and ignore the pressure for policy changes.  The 
neoliberal economic reform of 1989 was an extreme attempt 
to get around the stakeholders in the system.  The failure 
of this reform was due to widespread domestic opposition. 
In 1994, President Caldera reestablished the 
traditional links with FEDECAMARAS and CTV and quickly 
returned to the model of the state intervening in the 
economy.120 
The Washington consensus was rejected due to political 
and economic breakdown and interest group pressure to 
maintain the status quo in economic development.  The 
outcome on Venezuela’s relations with the United States has 
been to reduce integration as this poses a direct threat to 
the status quo of sowing the oil.  Using oil rents allows 
Venezuela to subsidize domestic industries and pursue ISI 
policies.  The results are overpaid workers, high corporate 
profits, and an elevated role of the state in the economy.  
Further integration with the United States would threaten 
noncompetitive domestic and state industries. 
With the election of President Chávez Venezuela once 
again has a chief executive who is willing to ignore 
political parties (including his own), CTV, and 
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FEDECAMARAS.  Will this more independent policy making 
ability influence economic policy?  Up until the end of 
2001, Chávez pursued a dual track strategy of sowing the 
oil and pursuing limited economic reforms.  Why he is seen 
as such a nemesis to U.S. interests is the focus of the 
next chapter. 
  75 
V. THE IMPACT OF PRESIDENT CHÁVEZ ON BILATERAL 
RELATIONS 
The press leads one to believe that the greatest 
source of contention between the United States and 
Venezuela is President Hugo Chávez.  It is argued his 
independent and audacious foreign policy represents a 
radical break with prior administrations.121  Who is this man 
and how accurate are these views? 
President Chávez was one of the leaders of the first 
1992 coup attempt.  He was later pardoned by President 
Caldera and looked to politics to change the system.  In 
1999, he was elected by the largest margin in Venezuelan 
history.  President Chávez quickly shook up Venezuelan 
politics by rewriting the constitution, dismissing the 
congress, and replacing Supreme Court judges. In 2000, 
Chávez was elected to a six-year term under a new 
constitution. 
It is true that Chávez has been a consistent critic of 
the United States, representative democracy, and neoliberal 
economic reform.  Critics argue that his power is highly 
concentrated to the extent that it endangers democracy.  
This chapter will determine if President Chávez is the 
causal factor for Venezuela’s more independent foreign 
policy.  Three issues will be addressed.  First, it will be 
determined if Chávez is really different from past 
executives in Venezuela.  Second, I will examine the issues 
of contention between the United States and Venezuela that 
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are unique to the Chávez administration.  Lastly, I will 
analyze the U.S. view towards President Chávez. 
A. CHÁVEZ COMPARED TO PAST PRESIDENTS 
The common perception outside Venezuela is that the 
country has a totally new type of politician with an order 
of magnitude increase in executive powers.  A closer look 
at history shows this is not the case.  In both politics 
and economics, President Chávez has more in common with his 
predecessors than differences.  There are a few significant 
departures and these will be discussed.  On paper, the new 
1999 Constitution strengthened the executive but in reality 
the power relative to other branches of government is not 
much different than previous administrations.  Who Chávez 
surrounds himself with and his criticism of the United 
States are the main difference in the political realm 
compared to past presidents. 
1. Political Comparisons 
President Chávez used some of the same political tools 
as past presidents to get elected.  He ran on an anti-
reform, anti-party, anti-corruption platform very similar 
to what his predecessor Rafael Caldera used.  Chávez made 
great use of religious imagery, Simón Bolivar, and 
continuous public appearances during his aggressive 
campaign. 
This resembled President Pérez’s 1973 spirited 
campaign, “moving at a half run, Pérez swept through the 
streets of Venezuela, shaking hands, greeting local party 
functionaries, visiting plazas and radio stations, and 
leaping mud puddles in the unpaved barrios.”122  Pérez also 
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used Bolivarian symbols. Perez’s aggressive and messianic 
personal style, his access to enormous financial resources, 
and his extraordinary popularity resulted in an incredible 
concentration of power.123  The outcome of Chávez’s campaign 
was almost identical. 
Many critics argue Chávez is consolidating power and 
is putting democracy at risk in doing so.  Dennis Jett, 
former ambassador to Peru, said Chávez is “the greatest 
threat to democracy in Lain America, with the possible 
exception of the FARC.”124  It must be remembered that these 
“power grabs” have been legal and approved in referendums 
by the Venezuelan people.  Chávez has consolidated power 
but this is not the first time this has happened in 
democratic Venezuela. 
The most notorious case of presidential dominance 
in Venezuela is the first term of Pérez.  His 
party had a majority in both houses of the 
national Congress, all the state congresses, and 
most municipal governments.  He asked for and got 
delegated authority, and he could issue decrees 
justified by the restriction of the right to 
economic liberty.  He issued more that 3,000 
decrees of one sort or another.  Of the bills 
passed by Congress during his administration, 89 
percent were initiated in the executive branch.125 
Many scholars considered the pre-1999 Venezuelan 
presidential system weak relative to other countries and 
argue that the 1999 Constitution concentrates power in the 
executive.  The 1961 Constitution lists 22 powers and 
duties of the president while the 1999 Constitution has 24.  
Of these 24, 17 are nearly verbatim from the 1961 document.  
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The new executive powers granted in the 1999 Constitution 
are summarized in table two. 
 
Added Executive Powers 
Direct the action of the government 
Promote and assign officers after the rank of Colonel/Captain 
Decree Law (existed in 1961 Conbsitiution but under emergency powers) 
Formulate and direct approval of the National Development Plan 
Dissolve the National Assembly in accords with the Constitution. 
Call for referendums as provided for in the Constitution 
Convoke and preside over a national defense council 
Six-year presidential term. 
Eligible for one immediate reelection 
 
Table 2.   Increased Presidential Powers under the 1999 
Constitution 
From:  “Venezuela:  Constitutions”, 
http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Constitutions/Venezuela/vene
zuela.html. 
An extended term does increase the power of the 
president but a careful reading of the 1999 Constitution 
shows the position is now more accountable because a 
referendum can be called to remove the president midway 
through his term.126  The ability to run for reelection 
should also increase presidential accountability to 
constituents. 
The ability to dissolve the National Assembly is a 
powerful new tool for the head of state.  However, many of 
the powers given to the president are also given to the 
National Assembly.  For example, Chapter 4 Article 71 
states that the people, president, or the National Assembly 
can call for a referendum.  The National Assembly is not 
powerless and in some aspects can control the executive.  
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National Assembly approval is required for the president to 
leave the country when absences are greater than five days 
and for the use of the military overseas.  It can also vote 
out the vice-president by a three-fifths vote and has other 
broad roles of government oversight. 
Decree authority is not new in Venezuela and is the 
tool that allowed the executive, in practice, to be very 
strong under pre-1999 constitutions.  From 1959 to 1995, 
the executive branch initiated 84 percent of all 
legislation passed.127  Under the 1961 Constitution, 
presidents had decree authority in the process of executing 
a law, states of emergency, when constitutional rights were 
restricted or suspended, when delegated by congress, and in 
situations of domestic or foreign conflict.  Every 
president from 1961 to 1999 used some type of decree 
authority.  Most were in the economic and social order 
realms.  The former needed approval by the congress but the 
latter was granted directly by the 1961 Constitution.  
Chávez was granted decree authority by the National 
Assembly to expedite the process of making new laws.  This 
expired on November 13, 2001, at which point a total of 49 
laws had been passed.128  Again, this is not a new phenomenon 
in Venezuela and like his predecessors Chávez used decree 
powers to advance his policies. 
Chávez is a shrewd politician and is attempting to 
consolidate his power just like AD and COPEI did over 40 
years ago.  Recently, Chávez criticized puntofijismo (the 
Pact of Punto Fijo) as being “more shameful” than the Goméz 
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dictatorship.129  Yet the political road Chávez is following 
looks very similar to those of his “oligarchic” rivals.  
Chávez is using the mandate he received from the people (57 
percent in the 2000 election and highest in Venezuelan 
history) to dismantle his political foes.  Just like the 
traditional parties used their power to do away with the 
communist party.  The 2000 change in leadership of the CTV 
via national referendum is another example of Chávez 
consolidating his power.  This looks very similar to the 
actions AD and COPEI took to monopolize unions, student 
organizations, and other groups in civil society. 
The main difference with Chávez in the political realm 
is the actors who influence the executive.  As shown in the 
last chapter, in the past presidential persuasion was 
monopolized by FEDECAMARAS and CTV.  Chávez has attacked 
both groups as being part of the oligarchy and locked them 
out of the law making process.  He has surrounded himself 
with people he trusts, many of them being active duty and 
retired military officers.  The variation in the advisory 
circle/interest groups who pressure President Chávez has 
not affected foreign policy toward the U.S. 
It is true that President Chávez is pushing the limits 
of democracy with his consolidation of power.  The purpose 
of this section is not to defend Chávez’s record on 
democracy but to point out that many past presidents had 
the control Chávez is now seeking.  The changes occurring 
internally are not fundamental and are not as yet impacting 
policy towards the United States.  It is the same Venezuela 
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with the same patronage system, what has changed is who is 
doling out and receiving the oil spoils. 
2. Economic Policies 
A major worry among many observers of the 1999 
election was what Chávez would do in the economic realm 
after taking power.  During his campaign he had hinted at 
reversing reforms as had President Caldera.  Despite the 
inflammatory campaign rhetoric no reforms were reversed and 
not a lot has changed in Venezuela’s economy.  In fact, 
Chávez has taken a more neoliberal approach to the economy 
than Caldera.  He established a petroleum stabilization 
fund to recycle windfall oil profits, upheld contracts with 
foreign oil companies, opened the gas and petrochemical 
sectors to private capital, introduced a world-class market 
oriented telecommunications law, and signed a bilateral tax 
treaty with the United States.  He reacted to low oil 
prices in 1999 by  “enacting a surprisingly orthodox and 
austere economic policy.”130  At the same time, Chávez 
continues the Venezuelan tradition of “sowing the oil” in 
order to build a self-sustaining, equitable, and stable 
development path. 
The major changes in economic policy are new as of 
this writing and the outcome is as yet undetermined.  In 
November 2001, 49 laws were passed under the 2000 Special 
Powers Act.  Chávez asked for and received this authority 
from the National Assembly in order to “legislate matters 
of national interest for one year.”131  Six broad areas were 
approved in the legislation where this authority could be 
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used:  1) Financial, 2) Economic and social, 3) 
Infrastructure, transport, and services, 4)Citizen security 
and justice system, 5) Science and technology, and 6) 
Organization and functioning of the state.132  Many of these 
new laws deal directly with economic issues, including oil, 
small and medium businesses, and land reform.  The passing 
of these laws resulted in apprehension within Venezuela and 
internationally. 
Venezuela polled last in a November 2001 Morgan 
Stanley survey of likely places to invest in Latin America.  
Respondents cited the dependence of the economy on oil and 
the recent passage of laws associated with the Special 
Powers Act for not investing in Venezuela.133  The new Oil 
Law raised tax rates on foreign oil companies.  For heavy 
crude oil royalties went from one percent to 20-30 percent, 
the tax rate increased from 34 percent to 50 percent.  In 
light crude the royalty rates increased to 30 percent from 
16.7 percent, though taxes fell to 50 percent from 67 
percent.134 
Domestically, criticism and opposition to the new laws 
abound.  State governments are opposed to some laws because 
it centralizes power with the federal government.  In civil 
society, an alliance of business, labor and opposition 
groups, opposed the package of laws passed in November 
2001. 
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President Chavez has courted investors.  He visited 
wall street shortly after his election and in November 2001 
full page adds were taken out in the New York Times 
advertising Venezuela as a place to invest and do business.  
However, the dual track system of sowing the oil and 
pursing some aspects of the Washington consensus will 
continue to cause bilateral tensions. 
3. Criticism Of The United States 
This is one area where Chávez sets himself apart from 
other Venezuelan presidents. His criticism of the United 
States runs the spectrum of issues.  His anti-U.S. rhetoric 
has been voluminous.  However, most of his actions have 
been limited to pursuing those issues vital to Venezuela’s 
interests:  sovereignty, OPEC unity, a viable economic 
model, and democracy.  With the increased transshipment of 
narcotics through the country in the 1990s, drugs also 
became a vital interest. 
After 1999 floods that killed an estimated 30,000 
Venezuelans, the United States sent two Navy ships loaded 
with equipment and Sea Bees to help rebuild destroyed 
areas.  Chávez rejected the help stating, “I want to 
clarify to the world that North American troops are not 
going to come to Venezuela.”135  In April 2001, Chávez 
announced his country would oppose a U.S.-sponsored 
resolution criticizing China on human rights records.136  
Prior to this Venezuela had abstained on this issue.  
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Despite being headline grabbers, these actions are 
consistent with Venezuela’s concepts of sovereignty and 
human rights. 
In 2000, a big diplomatic uproar was caused by 
Chávez’s trip to Iraq and Libya.  He managed to surpass 
this diplomatic mess in late 2001 by hinting that the U.S. 
bombings in Afghanistan were not justified and must stop.  
Later Chávez clarified that his government “has no desire 
to damage relations with the United States” and lamented he 
was misunderstood about his comments on Afghanistan.137 
The Clinton administration largely ignored Chávez’s 
anti-American rhetoric.  John Maisto, United States 
Ambassador to Venezuela under Clinton, stated “watch what 
Chávez does, not what he says.”138  The Bush administration 
has become more critical and in the Afghanistan issue 
recalled the Venezuelan Ambassador for consultations. 
Chávez’s criticisms of the United States are well 
documented but with few exceptions they do not translate to 
actions.  In the cases that do (denying over flight 
requests, strengthening OPEC allies, opposing U.S. 
resolutions on human rights and sanctions, and rejecting 
flood aid) higher order interests are at stake.  The 
exceptions (visits to rogue leaders and Afghanistan 
statement) seem to have as their purpose to provoke the 
United States and are not consistent with Venezuela’s 
interests.  The goal is to thrust Venezuela into a position 
of leadership in Latin America and the world and this 
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cannot be achieved by acquiescing to the United States.  
Nor can it be reached by being an irresponsible actor on 
the world stage.  Venezuela’s more autonomous and 
independent foreign policy creates a more complicated 
bilateral relationship and it is more likely the United 
States will continue to have “problems” with Venezuela. 
B. ISSUES OF CONTENTION UNIQUE TO CHÁVEZ 
As shown above, President Chávez is not that much 
different from past Venezuelan Presidents.  This section 
will identify the issues of contention with the United 
States that are unique to the Chávez administration.  
Despite all the bad press, the topics that can be 
attributed to just the current government are the view of 
the best form of democracy and opposition to Plan Colombia.  
Issues like OPEC, sovereignty, sactions, and Cuba go back 
decades. 
President Chávez promotes a view of participative 
democracy.  In a Washington Post interview Chávez stated, 
“representative democracy had failed Venezuelans because 
those who had been elected to govern for the people had 
betrayed them and governed for small elites.”139  Chávez’s 
model of democracy relies on direct participation from the 
citizens.  These include initiatives, referenda, and 
recalls that allow citizens to bypass normal channels of 
lawmaking.  For example, a referendum was used to remove 
the AD head of CTV.  Citizens did not call for the election 
but by their votes did remove the head of CTV. 
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The 2001 Summit of the Americas showed just how 
important this view of democracy is.  Venezuela did not 
sign the Declaration of Quebec City and instead reserved 
its position.140  This was because the language of the text 
used “representative democracy”. 
While this issue is important, it is not the source of 
much contention between the two countries.  For the most 
part, policy makers in the United States are happy with an 
electoral notion of democracy and are not worried about 
promoting more complicated aspects of democracy in Latin 
America. 
Plan Colombia is an issue of contention attributable 
to Chávez but this is because he was president when it was 
finally backed by the United States.  It should be noted 
that Brazil is opposed to the militarized aspects of Plan 
Colombia and it is likely that any Venezuelan executive 
would have the same reservations President Chávez has about 
a military build up in neighboring Colombia due to historic 
and ongoing territorial disputes over the Guarjira 
Peninsula and Gulf of Venezuela.  Drugs are a vital 
interest to the United States so this issue could set the 
tone of the bilateral relationship. 
Chávez has taken a more active role in OPEC.  He is 
credited for strengthening the cartel and bringing up world 
oil prices.  While visits to his counterparts in Libya and 
Iraq were controversial a strong OPEC is an established 
Venezuelan interest. 
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Both inside and outside Venezuela Chávez is attacked 
for his association with Fidel Castro and Cuba.  President 
Chávez is Castro’s greatest ally in the hemisphere and the 
relationship between the two countries is at a high point.  
However, Venezuela has been pushing for Cuban inclusion 
into the OAS for over ten years.  It is well to remember 
that Venezuela has voted opposite to the U.S. on Cuban 
issues in the United Nations since 1992.  The close 
relationship with Cuba is not new, it is just stronger than 
in the past. 
However, Chávez budding up to Castro, Hussein and 
Qaddafi is a big departure from past Venezuelan policy.  
Venezuela opposed U.S. resolutions because they sympathized 
with the people, not the leaders.  Chavez’s relationship 
with rogue leaders is an irritate to the United States. 
C. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS PRESIDENT CHÁVEZ 
The general, the position towards Venezuela and Latin 
American as a whole is one of promoting democracy.  Because 
Chávez was democratically elected the United States has 
less room to criticize him and almost no room to call for 
his removal.  As former Ambassador John Maisto stated, “at 
the end of the day the Venezuelan people democratically 
elected him [Chávez] to govern the country.”141 
Vital U.S. interests at stake in our relationship with 
Venezuela are oil (including OPEC) and drugs.  Peripheral 
issues are the type of democracy in Venezuela, economics, 
and relations with rogue leaders.  Chavez has not directly 
threatened the core U.S. interests of access to inexpensive 
oil or cooperation in the Drug War. 
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Venezuela’s oil is very important for the United 
States.  Venezuela provides 15 percent of American oil 
imports and has the largest proven reserves outside the 
Middle East.  The late 2001 increased tension in the Middle 
East and war in Afghanistan makes Venezuela, a short four-
day tanker trip from the United States, an even more 
attractive alternative for American policy makers.  Because 
of this, Washington will continue to tolerate an outspoken 
Chàvez to ensure access to this vital natural resource.  
However, if Chávez were to take action that would put 
access to oil in doubt the U.S. would react strongly. 
Under the Bush administration the U.S. is paying more 
attention to words of Chávez. Prior to late 2001 the United 
States had failed to take any significant action against 
Chávez for his words and actions against U.S. interests.  
The strongest censure under the Clinton administration was 
due to the Iraq visit.  U.S. State Department spokesman 
Richard Boucher stated it was “particularly galling that 
the first visit to Iraq by a head of state is by a 
democratically elected leader.”142  After Chávez compared the 
U.S. bombing raids in Afghanistan to the terrorist acts 
committed on the United States on September 11th Washington 
recalled the Venezuelan Ambassador for consultations.  This 
is not surprising now that terrorism has become a vital 
interest in U.S. relations with all countries. 
D. SUMMARY 
Individuals are important in international relations.  
Chávez himself stated that he has “an ideological 
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conviction” about his policies.143  Inserting Venezuela as an 
actor on the world stage, pushing for a multipolar world, 
and developing Venezuela by sowing the oil are not new 
ideas.  The differences from past Venezuelan heads of state 
is that Chávez is more flamboyant and uses different 
interest groups in society (poor and military) to achieve 
his goals. 
President Chávez is not an important causal factor for 
the changing bilateral relationship between the United 
States and Venezuela.  Chávez is an aggravation for the 
U.S. and these irritations are added causes for the 
distancing but are not the main causes.  The U.S. can 
tolerate Chavez’s friendliness to rogue regimes, view of 
democracy, and opposition to Plan Colombia.  What will not 
be tolerated are threats to vital U.S. interests of oil and 
drugs.  Chávez is a point of friction and has transformed 
the direction of bilateral relations, however this change 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In the search for elements to explain Venezuela’s 
changing foreign policy towards the United States, the use 
of a single approach does not provide for accurate 
conclusions.  From a holistic perspective, the study of 
this case from three levels of analysis—international, 
domestic, and individual—provides fuller explanations.  
This concluding chapter will weigh the relative importance 
of each variable and the contribution each makes in 
explaining Venezuela’s new international strategy. 
This new strategy began with the 1994 administration 
of President Rafael Caldera.  He reversed economic reforms, 
made Brazil the top foreign policy issue, and began an 
expansion of Venezuelan allies.  At the same time, other 
Latin American countries were embracing both economic 
reform and further integration with the United States. 
A. INTERNATIONAL LEVEL EXPLANATIONS 
In this project, I examined four possible 
international explanations for the shift in Venezuela’s 
policy towards the United States:  the end of the Cold War, 
asymmetrical interdependence, rejection of the Washington 
consensus, and U.S. policy toward Venezuela. 
The strategic context for Venezuela changed 
significantly after the end of the Cold War.  This new 
environment allowed Venezuela to pursue other allies.  This 
variable does a good job in explaining what allowed 
Venezuela to shift its interests but does not explain why 
this shift was considered necessary.  The timing of this 
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variable also leaves its causality in question; the Cold 
War ended five years before Venezuela began to reduce 
attention on the U.S. 
 Asymmetrical interdependence offers another 
explanation of why Venezuela is pursing a more independent 
path.  The decisions that Venezuela has taken closely 
resemble the options outlined by Holsti for a country in 
this type of relationship.  However, as noted previously 
most of Latin America is in an asymmetrical relationship 
with the United States but have not chosen Venezuela’s 
approach.  The fact that Venezuela returned to ISI in 1994 
makes its economic relationship with the United States more 
asymmetrical. 
The increased international emphasis on free market 
economics provides further explanation in this case.  With 
the return to a policy of ISI, the Washington consensus 
directly threatened Venezuela’s development path of sowing 
the oil.  Venezuela’s protection of domestic industries 
runs counter to a strategy of further integration with the 
United States.  Oil wealth allows rejection of neoliberal 
economics to be a viable option. 
I found that examining unpopular U.S. policies towards 
Venezuela did not add explanatory power to the case.  
United States policy has remained constant and is not a 
causal variable in explaining Venezuela’s changing attitude 
towards the U.S. after 1994. 
In summary, at the international level the end of the 
Cold War made expansion of allies and markets an option.  
Asymmetrical interdependence was deepened by Venezuela’s 
1994 return to ISI.  The rejection of the Washington 
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consensus explains why Venezuela is not seeking to deepen 
integration with the United States as most of its peers are 
doing.  Venezuela began a textbook reform process in 1989 
yet five years later it was dead.  The source of opposition 
to these reforms resides at the domestic level. 
B. DOMESTIC LEVEL EXPLANATIONS 
A domestic level analysis provides an explanation for 
why Venezuela sees the Washington consensus as a threat.  
The political system in Venezuela evolved into a vehicle by 
which politicians, FEDECAMARAS, and CTV were the main 
beneficiaries of oil rents.  In order to maintain these 
benefits, elite actors did not expand the political system 
to new interest groups or allow competition at the national 
level.  Due to the rigidity of the founding political pact, 
corruption, inability of the government to meet social 
demands, and a failing economy, the political model 
collapsed.  Unfortunately, this breakdown occurred during 
an economic reform that locked out key actors from input 
into the process.  Both traditional parties and the 
Washington consensus were completely discredited.  After 
the reforming President Pérez was impeached in 1993, 
traditional groups quickly reestablished the status quo of 
ISI to maximize their benefits. 
C. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL EXPLANATIONS 
The impact on bilateral relations by President Chávez 
is minimal despite the high visibility of his criticisms of 
the United States.  The only significant policy divergence 
from past executives is his promotion of participative 
democracy and budding up to dictators.  His powers are 
greater than past executives but in practice they are not 
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much different.  Chávez is a point of friction and has 
transformed the direction of bilateral relations, however 
this change is not as fundamental as those at the 
international level. 
In summary, each level of analysis contributes to the 
distancing relation but the new international environment 
is the primary causal factor.  At the international level, 
the end of the Cold War and the failure of the Washington 
consensus in Venezuela have distanced the bilateral 
relationship.  The end of the Cold War gave Venezuela the 
ability to get out of its asymmetrical relationship with 
the U.S. and the failure of neoliberal economics gave it a 
reason to revert to the country’s historic model of 
development.  The domestic economy and politics are 
important because they explain why Venezuela can afford to 
diversify and pursue ISI (oil resources) and why sowing the 
oil is seen as the workable development model. 
D. WHAT TO LOOK FOR IN THE FUTURE 
Venezuela has shown that it can adapt to changing 
economic conditions although this usually only occurs as a 
last resort (i.e. 1983 devaluation, 1989 economic reforms).  
Because of the history ISI in Venezuela this model will 
most likely be pursued until its exhaustion.  At this 
point, some neoliberal reforms will be implemented.  This 
cycle has occurred a number of times in Venezuela shadowing 
the rise and fall of oil prices.  One positive aspect of 
this cycle is that many reforms manage to live on in the 
face of a return to ISI. 
The economic arena is the main area to watch to 
predict Venezuela’s future relations with the United 
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States.  High oil prices will allow Venezuela to maintain 
its current policy, while low oil prices will bring it 
closer to the Washington consensus.  A floating exchange 
rate (reduces protection of domestic industries) and/or 
removal of non-tariff barriers would be positive signs.  
Indications of distancing would be more restrictive 
policies on U.S. imports, Venezuela joining MERCOSUR, and 
an increase in economic disagreements. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY MAKERS 
Washington must not attribute shifts in the current 
bilateral relationship to President Chávez.  Venezuela’s 
choice to sow the oil as economic policy is the fundamental 
reason for the distancing from the United States, so this 
needs to be acknowledged to reduce friction and increase 
cooperation.  Washington should remember that it too 
protects many aspects of the U.S. economy from foreign 
competition and should continue to extend the same 
privilege to Venezuela.  Economic disagreements must 
continue to be resolved in WTO forums so they are decided 
on the merits of the case and not on which country can 
bring more power to bear on the issue. 
Patience is the most import tool the United States can 
exercise.  Sowing the oil has not proved to be a viable 
path for development in Venezuela.  Even with high oil 
prices, the inefficiencies of the model will eventually 
become evident and economic reforms will be implemented.  A 
return to neoliberal economics will come, returning the 
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